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ABSTRACT

Environmental Justice and Participatory Democracy: An
Emancipatory Policy Proposal analyzes the the public
participation guidelines for the Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act. The author argues that four challenges must be
addressed before the goal of environmental justice can be
achieved. These challenges include the challenge of citizen
participation, the epistemological challenge, the challenge
of integrating public values with technical concerns, and
the challenge of balancing environmental rights and
responsibilities. The author develops a policy proposal for
the creation of neighborhood environmental justice community
centers in low-income neighborhoods.
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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

Public participation in hazardous waste policy is a
challenge many federal, state, and local governments face.
Hie history of hazardous waste policy in the United States
provides a rich source for analyzing traditional models of
decision making. The purpose of this study, therefore, is to
analyze and critique current public participation procedures
and to develop a model for neighborhood environmental
justice centers in low income communities.
This study is timely because on February 11, 1994,
President Clinton signed Executive Order 12898.1 Clinton's
Executive Order was carried out in response to demands made
by environmental justice advocates during the 1990s who
argued that many low-income and minority communities are
chosen as sites for hazardous waste facilities. Advocates
argue that racial and ethnic minorities are excluded from
the decision making process because of "environmental
racism." Thus, environmental justice advocates demand to be
included as equal partners in the policy process in order to
overcome racism.
1

Much has been written about the failure of current
participatory mechanisms to involve the public in hazardous
waste policy decisions substantively and legitimately.2
Debates about the role of the public in environmental
decision making are often between centralists who generally
favor an elite model, and decentralists who support
participatory democratic and empowerment models. The elite
model is referred to as "traditional" decision making, while
the participatory model is referred to as "emancipatory".
These terms reflect two distinct environmental paradigms
that can be discovered when the history of environmentalism
in the United States is reviewed.3 I call these paradigms
"traditional environmentalism" and "emancipatory
environmentalism."
The "traditional" environmental paradigm grew out of
the conservation/preservationist movements of the
Progressive era in the early twentieth century. This
paradigm was founded on the premise of scientific
utilitarianism,4 which stressed the efficient use of
resources through management. Implicit in this paradigm is
the assumption that humans can and should manage and control
the natural environment.5 This paradigm is implicitly
founded on the biblical edict found in Genesis 1:28; that
man should have dominion over the Earth. While this
presumption informed environmentalism for many decades, the
rise of civil rights, feminism, and anti-war movements

during the 1970s challenged generally accepted beliefs about
"man's" relationship to the environment. This relationship
had traditionally been hierarchical and anthropocentric.
Although the relationships between civil rights, feminism,
the anti-war movement of the 1960s and 1970s, and the
environmental movement seem tenuous, they are, in fact,
similar in many respects. Each of these movements attempted
to displace the hegemony of the hierarchical,
anthropocentric, rationalist decision making model that
informed social policy in the United States. Women, African
Americans, and environmentalists sought to emancipate
society from limiting beliefs that were rooted in JudeoChristian ethics and modem science.
The emergence of the environmental justice movement
during the 1980s and 1990s represented a significant change
in the environmental agenda. Called "emancipatory
environmentalism, "6 this emerging phase of the environmental
movement challenges traditional Western conceptual
frameworks, economic practices, social relationships,
political processes, and ethical systems. Radical changes in
the way we think, make decisions, relate to one another, and
care for ourselves and our environment are necessary in
order to achieve environmental justice, argue emancipatory
environmentalists.7 Central to the emancipatory project is
finding ways to end domination, including class domination,
racism, patriarchy, and the domination of nature.

Emancipatory environmentalism thus expands the traditional
environmental agenda to include social justice concerns. By
redefining environmentalism, emancipatory environmentalism
requires an inclusive, democratic decision making process
based on a conception of justice that transforms current
economic and social relationships.8 Thus, the policital
process becomes emancipatory and transformative on an
individual and social level.
When these two environmental paradigms clash, as they
have in the hazardous waste policy arena, the legitimacy of
the State's regulatory apparatus is at stake. To overcome
the perception that hazardous waste decisions are not
legitimate, Matheny and Williams conclude that "equal
representation of all interests in the affected populations
is essential."9 Equal representation assumes citizens have
equal access to the policy process.
However, in a study of 233 Washington scientific risk
professionals employed in the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) and other non-governmental firms, Thomas Dietz
and Robert Rycroft found that most risk professionals are
white males.10 Twenty percent of the respondents were women
and three percent were minorities.11 Thus, Dietz and Rycroft
conclude that women and people of color are often under
represented within the ranks of risk policy professionals.
If their conclusions are correct, then women and minorities
are, in fact, excluded from the policy process. I call this

5

exclusion "structural."
But another form of exclusion exists as well. This can
be found in examining the ways women become involved in
toxics struggles. When women become active in toxics
politics, they most often prefer grassroots organizing
tactics. Grassroots groups are often led by women who use
different leadership styles that are implicitly informed by
feminist standpoint epistemologies. Thus, the knowledge
women draw on in toxic struggles differs from the knowledge
traditionally used in environmental decision making. Women's
knowledge arises out of their daily lived experiences as
women, wives, and mothers. However, stereotypes of
"hysterical housewives" often hinder opportunities for
dialogue between members of racial, gender, and low-income
groups and public officials. These opportunities are often
truncated by the presence of conceptual/epistemological and
structural barriers. An epistemological barrier thus hinders
the realization of a truly participatory democratic process
with many low-income, female and minority citizens being
denied a "real" opportunity to participate in the policy
process. Although citizens have a responsibility to protect
the environment, many are denied a right to participate in
the environmental protection policy process because of
structural and epistemological barriers.
These barriers create several challenges that federal,
state, and local environmental agencies must address as they

develop environmental justice strategies that meet the goal
of true public participation. These challenges include
achieving a balance between the technical values of modem
science and public environmental values, the challenge of
true citizen participation, the standpoint and rationalist
epistemological challenge, and the rights and
responsibilities challenge. Each of these challenges is
addressed in the chapters that follow.
In Chapter Two I establish the historical context of
contemporary environmental policy with the passage of
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) of 1969 and the
creation of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) .
Within the first decade of the passage of NEPA, it became
clear that traditional decision making models could not
accommodate the emerging emancipatory environmental
paradigm. I discuss each of the challenges as they were
addressed by traditional methods.
In Chapter Three I discuss the emerging emancipatory
environmental paradigm and establish the historical context
from which it arose. This paradigm symbolizes the transition
to a new phase of environmental politics in the United
States that merges social and environmental justice
concerns. The environmental justice movement is a multi
cultural, multi-issue, global movement informed by critical
and feminist theory. I examine two case studies: Love Canal
and Emelle, Alabama to illustrate race, class, and gender
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exclusion in the policy process. These cases illustrate how
gender and racial exclusion operate within the policy
process.
In Chapter Four I discuss criticisms of the traditional
decision making model. In the second half the chapter I
analyze the guidelines for public participation and argue
that structural barriers prevent substantive public
participation because the process is based on the
traditional decision making model. This model cannot
accommodate environmental justice concerns because it is
based on an epistemology that separates values and
scientific rationality. Within the rationalist epistemology,
values are not considered valid knowledge claims. Thus,
policy clashes occur between the two paradigms because of
value differences in humanism and scientific rationality.
Citizens often approach policy decisions from a humanist
perspective while policy experts approach decisions from a
rationalist perspective. Consequently, communication between
the two groups is often inpossible.
In Chapter Five I examine the epistemological challenge
by examining differences between objectivist/rationalist and
feminist standpoint epistemologies. The
objectivist/rationalist epistemology informs environmental
decision making and has assumed hegemony in Western culture.
Feminist standpoint epistemologies challenge this hegemony
and offer an alternative basis for knowledge claims. Both of
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these epistemologies assume a particular standpoint. These
standpoints have counterparts in moral theory and provide
the basis for two distinct conceptions of justice.
In Chapter Six I explore the differences in conceptions
of justice between emancipatory environmentalists and the
EPA. I discuss Rawls's theory of justice, the Seventeen
Principles of Environmental Justice, and Wenz's theory of
environmental justice. I argue that environmental justice
demands a conception of justice that is inclusive and is
contextually based. Thus, relationships are important in
environmental justice. But relationships have a dubious
status in Rawlsian justice. I argue that Aristotle's theory
of justice may provide us with a more complete theory of
environmental justice.
Finally, in Chapter Seven I review the four challenges
and present a policy proposal for the creation of
neighborhood environmental justice centers. Because
environmental decisions involve neighborhoods and
communities, it is imperative that we create places where
neighbors can come together to develop citizenship skills
and political capacity. Although I do not develop an
emancipatory decision making model, I believe that the
creation of environmental justice centers will create a
place for an emancipatory process to emerge.
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CHAPTER TWO
THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY

The history of environmentalism in the United States
reveals two distinct paradigms. In this chapter I discuss
"traditional" environmentalism that arose from a desire to
conserve and preserve the natural environment. The core
values of traditional environmentalism are economic growth,
domination over nature, and nature as a resource with
instrumental value. This ideology was implicitly informed by
the Judeo-Christian ethic that man had a right, if not a
Divine obligation, to have dominion over all living things,
including nature and women. Traditional environmentalism is
thus founded on the belief that the environment can be
managed through reform and regulation of industrial
practices.1
Although conservationism began as "an anti-corporate
social movement," both conservationist and preservationist
environmental groups "managed to carve out for themselves a
major role in the policy arena regarding resources and the
natural environment."2 Thus, by the end of the Progressive
era environmentalism had adopted "expertise and rational
management of resources for business uses as the movement1s
10
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dominant ideology."3 This "right use" ideology informed
environmentalism through the post-World War II era.
Traditional environmental groups were organized around
wildlife and wilderness preservation and conservation.
Consequently, the anti-corporate stance taken by the earlier
conservationists was soon replaced by the "regulate and
reform" ideology. Man could continue to dominate nature but
only if he used rational methods to control his impact on
the environment.
With the publication of Rachel Carson's book Silent
Spring in 1962, the reform and regulate ideology was
challenged. Before the publication of Silent Spring, the
environmental movement in the United States was "a
revolution waiting for a manifesto."4 The manifesto came
with Rachel Carson's presentation of "scientific evidence in
clear, poetic, and moving prose that demonstrated how the
destruction of nature and the threat to human health from
pollution were completely intertwined. "5 But more important
was the fact that Carson implicitly questioned the rational
methods used to control man's impact on the environment. If
ecosystems were being destroyed, then the argument that
rational, right use methodologies could mitigate
environmental impact was invalid. Thus, the conservationist
approach of resource management may have worked at the turn
of the century but could no longer address contemporary
environmental problems.

The release of Silent Spring and its meteoric rise as a
best seller "was a triggering event for the entire
environmental movement because it mobilized the average
American."6 Public awareness about the dangers of pesticides
and inorganic chemicals increased in the United States.7
Silent Spring broadened the boundaries of traditional
environmentalism from remote wildlife areas to "everyone's
backyard." Environmental protection became everyone's
responsibility. How could the average American protect their
backyards from environmental degradation when most
environmental damage occurred because of corporate
industrial practices and the voices of average Americans
were absent from policy discussions about environmental
impacts? Because most Americans had no say in the impact
modem industrial practices had on the environment, by the
late 1960s it was clear that legislation was necessary to
stem environmental assault.
During the 1970s, many environmental laws were passed
beginning with the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)
in 1969. Sweeping in scope, NEPA provided the framework for
a new model of statutory legislation that specifically
addressed man's relationship to the environment.8 While many
environmental laws predated NEPA, none of the previous
legislation provided a comprehensive approach to
environmental protection. NEPA thus provided a statutory
framework for environmental subsequent environmental
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legislation.

The Rights and Responsibilities Challenge

Although NEPA section 101(c) initially provided
citizens with "a fundamental and inalienable right to a
healthful environment," the Conference Committee changed the
Act to read "each person should enjoy a healthful
environment and that each person has a responsibility to
contribute to the preservation and enhancement of the
environment."9 During the NEPA debates held on December 20,
1969, Henry M. Jackson, Senator from Washington, voiced his
opposition to this change for the record by arguing that
every person does have a fundamental and an
inalienable right to a healthful environment.
If this is not the law of this land, if an
individual in this great country of ours
cannot at the present time protect his right
and the right of his family to a healthful
environment, then it is my view that some
fundamental changes are in order.10
Congress institutionalized environmental
responsibilities but did not guarantee citizens a legal
right to a healthful environment. Although Senator Jackson
stated in the record he would introduce an environmental
rights bill, the bill was never ratified. Many states,
including Massachusetts and Pennsylvania, explicitly gave
citizens the right to a clean environment in the post-NEPA
years. Thus, some states approach environmental protection
from a balanced approach.
Balancing rights and responsibilities was not the only
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challenge facing the federal government in the post-NEPA
decade, as we shall see in the next section.

The Challenge of Values, Science, and Epistemology

Shortly after signing the National Environmental Policy
Act (NEPA) into law in January 1970, President Richard M.
Nixon created the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) by
Executive Order 11514 on March 5, 1970. EPA consolidated six
thousand employees from fifteen government agencies located
in three departments.11 For exanple, solid waste programs
were moved from the Department of Health, Education and
Welfare' (HEW) to EPA.12
NEPA explicitly stated that achieving a balance between
technical/economic concerns and environmental values and
amenities was important. Section 102(2)b of NEPA mandates
that
all agencies of the Federal Government
shall. ..identify and develop methods and
procedures...which will insure that presently
unquantified environmental amenities and
values may be given appropriate
considerations in decision-making along with
economic and technical considerations.13
However, the approach taken by EPA during its formative
years was founded on the same assumption that informed
environmental legislation and traditional environmentalism:
that science could provide solutions to the environmental
crisis through regulation and management.14 This presumption
is implicit in the traditional environmental paradigm. An
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overriding confidence in the ability of modem science and
technology to solve environmental problems is a key tenet in
the traditional paradigm. Implicit in this assumption is the
belief that rational methods will yield the best decisions
about the environment. As we shall see later, rationalist
epistemologies separate facts and values. Thus, balancing
technical and scientific facts with public values is
virtually impossible when using a rationalist epistemology
as the dominant mode of creating knowledge.
During the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)
Senate debates held on December 20, 1969, Senator Henry M.
Jackson argued that inadequacies in "present knowledge,
policies, and institutions for environmental management"
threatened "the quality of life all men seek. "1S Although
Jackson did not explicitly point out the limits of
traditional rationalist epistemologies, he argued that human
dignity was threatened by the expansive and impersonal
technology modem science has created.16 Thus, Jackson
implicitly questioned the epistemological premises of modem
science by arguing that science was "inpersonal." If an
impersonal technology was the result of modem science and
the epistemological presumptions on which it was based,
could modem science provide solutions to the environmental
crisis? This question plagued EPA from its inception.
EPA personnel were often "compelled to act under
conditions of substantial uncertainty" because the agency's
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role was to protect the public and the environment in a
timely fashion.17 Given "the inherent limitations of
science," EPA personnel often had to assume their knowledge
was greater than it actually was and make decisions based on
these assumptions.18
Sally Fairfax suggests that it is not science itself
that is limited but the approach taken by EPA. Instead of
conducting "pure research" which is how science should be
conducted, Fairfax argues that NEPA and the practices
adopted by EPA
rest on the assumption that there is virtue in simply
amassing and circulating scientific data...NEPA
reflects a misunderstanding of the nature of scientific
truth and the utility of scientific evidence. ..
However, NEPA has distorted the direction of scientific
inquiry by putting tremendous amounts of money and
effort into applied research. The science in impact
statements is not disciplined and not cumulative.
Proper scientific inquiry must proceed gradually, under
the full scrutiny of a skeptical and disciplined
profession. It cannot be rushed or obliged to take
positions on current issues if it is to be credible or
valid. It seems reasonable to suggest that one of the
long-term effects of NEPA will be the distortions it
has caused in the science it relies on.19
While science offered hope for the improvement of
environmental problems, it was limited, imperfect, and
subject to ideological and political manipulation.20 Despite
the misuses and inperfections of modem science, there were
no alternatives for alleviating environmental problems.

The Challenge Of Citizen Participation

Since citizen involvement in environmental policy was
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mandated by NEPA through the Environmental Impact Statement
(EIS) process and explicitly sanctioned through President
Nixon's Executive Order 11514,21 EPA faced another
challenge: the challenge of citizen participation. Despite
criticisms about the quality of citizen involvement in
environmental policy, subsequent environmental legislation
followed the framework established by the spirit of NEPA as
a "people's policy."
A review of post-NEPA legislation indicates that
public participation in the environmental policy process was
included in most environmental laws. The Clean Air Acts of
1970 and 1977, the 1972 amendments to the Federal Water
Pollution Control Act, the Toxic Substances Control Act of
1976 (TOSCA), the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of
1976 (RCRA), and the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA) contained
provisions for public involvement. Although the legislative
intent of NEPA and subsequent environmental legislation may
have been philosophically aligned with the principles of
democratic participation, policy implementation proved to be
problematic, particularly in the area of hazardous waste
policy.
Signed into law in 1976,22 the purpose of the Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) was to provide a
regulatory framework for a "cradle to grave" manifest
tracking system for hazardous wastes.23 In keeping with the
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pluralistic model of decision making that evolved during the
1960s and early 1970s, policymakers included provisions for
public participation in hazardous waste facility planning.
Section 7004 (b) of the Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act defines the parameters of public involvement as
[p]ublic participation in the development,
revision, implementation, and enforcement of
any regulation, guideline, information, or
program under this chapter shall be provided
for, encouraged, and assisted by the
Administrator and the States. The
Administrator, in cooperation with the
States, shall develop and publish minimum
guidelines for public participation in such
processes.24
By the late 1970s hazardous waste had assumed a
prominent place on the political agenda, making public
participation in the facility siting process a highly
controversial, and sometimes impossible task. At the July 1,
1977 hearing held to review the public participation
guidelines for RCRA, Tom Williams, co-chairperson of the
guideline work group, read a statement by EPA Administrator,
Douglas Costle, which affirmed the importance of public
participation in hazardous waste management programs.
Genuine public awareness and participation
are essential for a number of
reasons...Unless the public has a reasonable
opportunity to learn about the thousands of
hazardous and somewhat less hazardous open
dumps, pits, ponds, and lagoons which exist
throughout our county, leeching their
witches' brew into the ground water, the
timely implementation of the Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act will suffer.25
Testimony given at the public hearing applauded efforts
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by lawmakers and EPA administrators to institutionalize
public participation in the implementation of RCRA. Despite
agreement about the importance of citizen participation in
hazardous waste facility siting decisions, most of the
testimony reflected a pessimistic tone about the mandated
public participation requirements found in RCRA.
Nonetheless, guidelines for public participation were
developed and codified in the Code of Federal Regulations.26
Despite attempts by EPA to understand and thus
alleviate public fear about waste disposal and treatment
practices, public opposition to hazardous waste disposal
sites remained a problem by the late 1970s. Viewed by policy
analysts as the "Not In My Back Yard" (NIMBY) syndrome, this
perspective renders the location of a facility as the
problem instead of the technology that produces the waste.27
Conversely, those who view the facility itself as the
problem refer to public opposition as a reaction against a
"Locally Unwanted Land Use" (LULU) .28 NIMBY movements are
often parochial, while LULU movements challenge the
necessity of a given technology. Thus, NIMBY and LULU
movements reflect different political ideologies.
Because grassroots groups became a major obstacle in
the successful inplementation of the Resource Conservation
and Recovery Act, the EPA Office of Solid Waste contracted
with a Washington D.C. consulting firm to study the facility
siting problem. The report, Siting of Hazardous Waste
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Management Facilities and Public Opposition, written by
Centaur and Associates, was released in November, 1979.29
The purpose of the Centaur project was twofold. First,
it sought to understand the factors that contributed to the
public's opposition to hazardous waste facilities. Second,
it intended to identify, by examining case studies of thirty
siting situations, actions that exacerbated or mitigated
public opposition to siting.30 Since the study was conducted
before the public participation guidelines for the RCRA were
codified, the report does not address the effectiveness of
those guidelines but does shed light on many of the problems
inherent in the siting process.
The study concluded that "probably the most important
single factor in addressing public opposition to siting is
the coordination and communication with the public and local
officials."31 Local opposition, the study reported,
is rooted in fear of major and long-term
risks posed by facilities to the health and
welfare of the surrounding community. It
reflects a loss of faith by local residents
in the ability of government and private
industry to solve environmental problems and
simultaneously to consider and protect local
interests.32
While affected communities discussed "fears and risks,"
industry officials spoke in terms of "regulations and
technology" and "the terms of one are often not understood
by the other."33 Thus, dialogue between was difficult
because residents framed the issue as a justice issue while
technical experts framed the problem as one of science and
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regulations. Although citizens usually questioned the
fairness of how environmental burdens are distributed,
industry rarely addressed equity and justice concerns.
Despite the techniques used in several siting studies
to involve the public, failure to involve the public in
substantive ways was common. Substantive participation was
defined in the report as allowing "the public to provide
substantive input to [sic] technical and nontechnical
aspects of government decision-making.1,34 Although the
report does not explicitly address the integration of values
in public participation processes, the definition of
"substantive input" can be interpreted to mean discussion of
public environmental values, including justice and equity.35
Although NEPA "stipulated that social sciences were to
be integrated into the decision processes,1,36 demographic
and social analyses appeared to go beyond the scope of the
EPA. When Ruckelshaus appeared before the U.S. Civil Rights
Commission he claimed that EPA was a "technical and
scientific agency not equipped to judge disparate inpacts on
minority and low-income communities due to pollution.1137
Thus, EPA was ill-equipped to address justice and equity
concerns from the outset.
Sally Fairfax argues that "the public involvement that
NEPA has induced is so formal, so predictable, and so
proposal-oriented that it seems to have stultified the
dialogue between agencies and the public that was beginning

22

to develop in the late 1960s.1,38 She concludes that NEPA
actually truncated "citizen involvement in agency
deliberative processes." This problem was exacerbated when
Ronald Reagan was sworn into office in January 1981. Gains
made by environmental groups during the Nixon and Carter
administrations were undermined by the Reagan administration
through the reduction of fiscal support for citizen
participation programs in environmental decision making.
Stephen J. Durham, an EPA Regional Administrator in
Denver, stated in an internal memo that " [n]o grant awards
to a State, or any other entity, should contain any funds
for public relations or public participation unless such
activities are mandated by Federal statute or regulation.1,39
The reason given for cutting public participation funds by
Mr. Durham's assistant, Judy Herb, was " [m]ost of the public
participation money was going to environmental groups, not
citizens' groups, and he didn't think it was right for the
taxpayers to foot the bill for them. "40
By pulling federal support for citizen participation
programs, Reagan effectively crippled local attenpts to
insure citizen involvement in the controversial problem of
hazardous waste disposal. With little guidance from the EPA,
states were left on their own to carry out public
participation programs as unfunded mandates. The growth of
the NIMBY syndrome (Not In My Back Yard) may have been a
direct outgrowth of the lack of support for public
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involvement programs by the federal government during the
Reagan administration41 and the institutionalization of
cost-benefit analysis (CBA) as the preferred method of
evaluating policy impacts.42
Citizen involvement in the environmental decision
making process was thus complicated by the inadequacies of
traditional decision methodologies that separated facts and
values into two distinct epistemological realms. While
citizens approached the policy process from a humanist
perspective, experts adopted a rationalist approach that
required objectivity. Thus, true dialogue and citizen
participation was truncated by the presence of a policy
process that could not bridge the epistemological gap
between facts and values. Whether this is the cause of
environmental injustice is a matter of much speculation and
one that goes beyond this study. However, it appears that a
combination of many factors contributed to the emergence of
the environmental justice movement in the late 1980s. The
reliance on experts to solve societal problems, the
limitations of rationalist decision making methodologies,
and conservative politics came together to create a milieu
that made environmental injustice a reality.

Conclusions

Several challenges faced EPA in the two decades of
environmental policy iirplementation. In conclusion, I review
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the challenges raised throughout this chapter.

The Technical/Scientific and Public Values Challenge

At first glance, NEPA and EPA appeared to offer
solutions to the worsening problem of environmental
degradation through the application of traditional
scientific and technical methods. However, the environmental
problems of the late twentieth century were not merely
scientific and technical problems amenable to reform and
regulation. Instead, environmental problems were political
and economic problems that could not be solved by applied
science. Although EPA attempted to protect the public and
the environment through science, environmental problems
involved more than science. Considerations of distributive
justice and environmental values were important in the
public participation process. However, limitations of the
traditional decision making model and rationalist
epistemologies truncated the possibilities for addressing
justice and equity concerns.

The Epistemological Challenge

Although logical positivism has been discredited as an
epistemology by philosophers of science,43 it remains
"firmly institutionalized in legislative and administrative
requirements."44 NEPA and EPA did not escape the normative
philosophical assunptions of logical positivist theory.45
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NEPA mandated that technical/scientific and environmental
values should be balanced in the decision process, but the
epistemological requirements of traditional scientific
methodologies, which were adopted by EPA, are not amenable
to considerations of justice and fairness. Judging fairness
of the distribution of environmental burdens was beyond the
scope of EPA analytic methodologies because the distinction
between objective science and values is a central
distinction made by logical positivism. Thus, experts and
citizens often approached environmental problems from
different perspectives. One approach was decidedly humanist
and value laden while the other approach was objective and
value neutral.

The Challenge of Citizen Participation

Although NEPA is credited for expanding the role of
citizens in the environmental policy process through the
Environmental Impact Statement46 (EIS) process, some
opponents of NEPA argue that citizen involvement in
environmental policy actually predated NEPA.47 Certainly the
Administrative Procedures Act of 194648 (APA) existed before
NEPA and opened the rule making process to citizens through
a variety of methods.49 Critics, however, argue that NEPA
did little to foster meaningful citizen involvement in the
policy process. Without federal support to supplement local
citizen groups efforts to find the technical knowledge
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necessary to participate as equal partners in the decision
making process, many low-income and minority citizens were
excluded from the hazardous waste facility siting process.
This was exacerbated by the Reagan administration's attitude
toward public participation. By pulling funds for citizen
groups, Reagan effectively crippled local citizens attempts
to participate as equal partners in the process.

The Rights and Responsibilities Challenge

While NEPA initially guaranteed fundamental rights to
all citizens for clean air, soil, and water, word changes
during the Committee drafting process eliminated
environmental rights. Citizens, however, were expected to
accept responsibility for maintaining and enhancing the
quality of the environment without any statutory guarantee
of environmental rights. By failing to balance environmental
responsibilities with environmental rights, NEPA may have
contributed to the rise of grassroots activism in low-income
and minority communities as citizens became aware of the
class contradictions inherent in environmental policies.
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CHAPTER THREE

THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF EMANCIPATORY ENVIRONMENTALISM

As we saw in the last chapter, Henry M. Jackson,
Senator from Washington, was a key player in the NEPA Senate
debates. Jackson, critical of the impersonal technology that
threatened the environment, also recognized that "a new kind
of revolutionary movement" was underway in the United
States. Environmental concern thus shifted from "the
exclusive province of a few conservation organizations to
the campus, to the urban ghettos, and to the suburbs."1
This concern captured the nation's attention on April
22, 1970. Earth Day dawned during a period of social
upheaval and cultural transformation that reached a zenith
by the late 1960s. The social justice and liberation
ideologies of the civil rights, anti-war, and women's
movements provided the philosophical basis for emancipatory
environmentalism as did the world views of indigenous and
native cultures. Emancipatory environmentalism thus presumes
the metaphor of "web of life" to capture an essential
difference between the two environmental paradigms.
Since all problems are viewed as interconnected,
emancipatory environmentalists believe that radical social
31
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change is necessary to achieve justice. Emancipatory
environmentalists integrate social and environmental
justice. Thus, social problems have an environmental
dimension. However, the traditional environmental paradigm
cannot accommodate the social dimensions of environmental
impacts because it utilized a "single issue approach."2
Citing differences in goals and strategies, James N.
Smith argues that traditional environmentalists groups would
conflict with groups seeking "social justice and equal
opportunity.1,3 Smith postulated that
an elite, upper middle class, exclusively
white sector of American society is using the
environment to protect 'it1s own room at the
top' from the encroachments of those less
favorably placed on the social and economic
ladder.4
If environmental organizations failed to address these
issues, Smith predicted that the environmental movement and
social justice movements were on a collision course. It
would be, as Smith warned, a clash between the "haves and
the have nots." He argued that critics of the environmental
movement, including black activists, blue collar workers,
and scholars, insisted the environment movement was
"consciously elitist."5
Smith's predictions came true as low-income and
minority women organized grassroots groups in communities
chosen as sites for hazardous waste facilities. This
environmental activism provides the political and
philosophical basis for an inclusive, multi-cultural, multi-
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issue, emancipatory environmental movement informed by
ecofeminist theories.

Women and Waste Policy

The link between housing and sanitation policy was
clearly established during the latter part of the nineteenth
century in large urban areas with the rise of industrialism.
The efforts of Jane Addams and the establishment of the
settlement house movement in Chicago during the late 1880s
provides historical evidence to support my argument that
waste disposal methods and policies are issues of home and
family. A critical examination of women's labor reveals the
degree to which women are concerned with waste in their
daily lives. From changing diapers, to sorting garbage for
recycling, to cleaning the house, washing dishes and
clothes, and caring for the sick, waste disposal methods are
part and parcel of women's daily life. Waste disposal
methods, and the attendant social and health concerns, have
traditionally been a social problem of particular concern to
social workers, public health professionals, and women.6
However, as we saw in the last chapter, EPA consolidated
waste programs which had previously been housed in HEW. By
moving waste from HEW to EPA, the social aspect of waste
policy shifted from the realm of women and social work to
the realm of scientific experts.
As women and mothers became involved in local toxic

struggles during the 1980s and 1990s, the environmental
frame of waste policy shifted from "issues of science" to
include "personal experience and pain".7 Yet women's
involvement in toxic struggles are complicated by "the
exclusion of most people from the policy process.1,8
Typically, low-income women represent the community while
middle class white males represent government and industry.
When women realize that government policies do not protect
their families, this awareness "exposes the false assumption
that the traditional policy process will be democratic and
responsive to their needs."9
By organizing their communities and neighborhoods
against hazardous waste facilities, many low-income women
develop an awareness of how gender and class inequities
shape the policy process.10 Through their involvement in
environmental justice struggles, participants' political
beliefs are often transformed as they develop critiques of
liberal democracy.11 For women, this process of political
consciousness raising is irrplicitly informed by feminist
theory.12 Thus, the hazardous waste policy process is
potentially an emancipatory, transformative political
process for many women that links demands for social justice
with environmental justice.
The experiences of Hazel Johnson, a fifty-seven-yearold mother of seven, and resident of Chicago's Altgeld
Gardens, exemplify the type of activism that emerged in the
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post-NEPA decade. Johnson organized "People for Community
Recovery," the first grassroots environmental group located
in a public housing project. Although the government knew
that the hazardous waste facilities surrounding her
neighborhood were the probable cause of health problems,
Johnson argues EPA officials failed to enforce hazardous
waste policies.
Johnson's skeptical attitude toward EPA stems from her
lived experience as a resident of Altgeld Gardens where she
witnessed women suffering miscarriages, giving birth to
babies with congenital anomalies, and the early death of her
husband in 1969. Although her husband smoked, Johnson
wonders if his death may have been caused by constant
exposure to the "toxic doughnut" created by hazardous waste
facilities that surrounds her neighborhood.
Although residents in Altgeld Gardens showed a higher
incidence of chronic lung diseases and troubled pregnancies
in a survey done by the University of Illinois School of
Health, Dr. Herbert White concluded that no clear-cut
pattern of cause and effect can be established support
arguments that increased incidence of disease in the area
was caused by pollution.13
Johnson's experiences are not unlike those of other
low-income women who find themselves and their families
affected by hazardous waste policies in the United States.
Through their day-to-day existence as mothers, caretakers,
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and community residents, low-income women living near
hazardous waste facilities often conclude that environmental
policies created to protect the public are not legitimate.
Although Johnson does not explicitly argue that she does not
have environmental rights, her arguments implicitly contain
this conclusion. Thus, Johnson's experiences provide
evidence to support the argument that environmental justice
requires a balanced rights and responsibilities approach.
Lois Gibbs' story of her organizing experiences in Love
Canal illustrates many of the points made in the previous
discussion about the political transformation of women who
become involved in toxic struggles. More important, the Love
Canal case study illustrates the importance of gender and
class in the policy process.
Love Canal

In what could be called a bitter twist of irony,
residents of Love Canal, a working and middle class
neighborhood, confronted the chemical contamination of their
community during the mid-1970s. Toxic waste dumped by Hooker
Chemical Company spewed into neighboring waterways and
canals; seeped through residents' basement walls, causing
strange illnesses, miscarriages, and birth defects. When
local officials were unable to assist residents, a young
mother and resident of Love Canal, Lois Marie Gibbs
organized the neighborhood in "very rude and very crude"
political activity.14
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Gibbs chose this form of grassroots organizing because
she found that the normal policy process was unfair.
Although Gibbs initially believed that the policy process
was democratic, she eventually discovered through her
organizing experience, that the process is dominated by
powerful corporate and government officials.15 Dismissed by
government and corporate officials as an "hysterical
housewife," Gibbs overcame sexist stereotypes and
successfully captured the attention of local and state
officials.
By involving mothers and children in the antitoxic
movement at Love Canal, Lois Gibbs expanded the emancipatory
environmental agenda to include issues of class and
gender.16 At a meeting between Governor Hugh Carey and Love
Canal Homeowners, Gibbs and other mothers from her
neighborhood led a parade of pre-schoolers to the front of
the auditorium. Gibbs asked Carey if he was going to allow
the children of Love Canal to die from exposure to toxic
chemicals.17 By bringing private concerns of daily family
life into the public arena, Gibbs used the knowledge she
created from her social position as a woman and a mother to
impact public policy thus expanding the definition of
emancipatory environmentalism to include gender.
Although Love Canal involved class and gender issues,
race is a variable in hazardous waste struggles as well. In
the next section I discuss the emergence of the
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environmental justice movement.

Environmental Racism

Environmental justice movement is often associated with
"environmental racism," a term coined by Dr. Benjamin Chavis
at a press conference held in Washington D.C. to announce
the conclusions of a United Church of Christ study on race
and the environment. The United Church of Christ Commission
for Racial Justice

report, released in 1897, concluded that

race is the most significant variable in the location of
hazardous waste facilities.18 In the preface to the UCC
report, Chavis attributes the problem to "institutional
racism." Environmental racism became the focus of research
for many minority scholars during the next decade, including
the siting of the largest hazardous waste facility in the
United States.19
Warren, County and the GAO Report

Before discussing the Emelle case, however, we need to
understand the history of the environmental justice
movement. In 1982, the state of North Carolina sited a PCB
facility in a predominantly poor, black, community in Warren
County, a community with a history of civil rights
struggles. The waste facility was necessary because a New
Jersey hazardous waste disposal company illegally dumped
PCB-laced oil on the backroads of Warren County while
residents slept. Rather than ship the contaminated dirt out
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of state, environmental officials and experts decided to
site the facility within the state's borders in Warren
County.
When residents learned about the decision to site the
facility, they used civil rights organizing strategies to
protest the decision. Using civil disobedience, residents
blocked the trucks carrying the PCB-contaminated dirt and
oil. Over five hundred protesters were arrested, including
Dr. Benjamin Chavis, then Director of the United Church of
Christ Commission for Racial Justice. Representative Walter
Fauntroy, a member of Congress, was among those arrested. As
a result of his arrest, Fauntroy asked the General
Accounting Office to conduct a study on the location of
hazardous waste facilities in EPA's Region IV.
The 1983 General Accounting Office (GAO) report found
correlations between race, income, and the location of
offsite landfills in the Environmental Protection Agency's
Region IV.20 EPA's Region IV includes Alabama, Florida,
Georgia, Kentucky, Mississippi, North Carolina, South
Carolina, and Tennessee, states historically associated with
civil rights struggles. The GAO report revealed a pattern:
hazardous waste treatment facilities in the South are often
sited in poor, rural, predominantly black and Native
American communities. While the GAO report indicated a clear
pattern of the location of facilities and racial and
economic variables existed, it did not attribute race as the

40

cause of the pattern.
Emelle

The Emelle case is significant because it symbolizes
the innpact newly created environmental policies had on a
community with a history of racial differences. In the early
1980s during Governor George Wallace's administration, the
largest hazardous waste facility in the United States was
built near Emelle, a small, Southern predominantly black
community in Sumter County, with a population of slightly
over six hundred residents. Of those residents, seventy-nine
percent were black. Many of the residents were elderly and
poor.21 Ninety-three percent of the total Black population
lived below the poverty line.22
Emelle is situated in a part of the South called the
"black belt" - an area plagued by high rates of
unemployment.23 Sumter County lies on a bed of Selma chalk,
a geologically desirable location for a hazardous waste
facility.24 In a 1974 report to Congress on hazardous waste
disposal, EPA recommended areas with Selma chalk as
favorable sites for the location of hazardous waste disposal
facilities.25
James Parsons, son-in-law of then Governor George
Wallace, had ties to a company called Resource Industries,
which bought the land near Emelle. In 1978, the site was
sold to Chemical Waste Management, a company that owns four
out of the six largest landfills in the country. The company
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expanded the landfill after it was purchased. Residents were
unaware that the landfill was used to store hazardous waste
until workers began complaining about working conditions and
health problems.26 Residents were not aware of the facility
because the Environmental Impact Statement policy processes
was not followed.
In State of Alabama ex rel. Siegelman v. EPA, 911 F 2d
499 (11th Cir. 1990), the court upheld an EPA decision that

allowed Chemical Waste Management to site a hazardous waste
facility without preparing an Environmental Impact
Statement, as required by NEPA. Since RCRA came later in the
history of environmental legislation, the court reasoned, it
trumped NEPA requirements.27 The court argued that RCRA was
functionally equivalent to NEPA, thus the RCRA permit
process met EIS requirement.
Petitioners in the case argued that citizens were
denied "a meaningful opportunity" to participate in the
permitting process. The petitioners argued that EPA made it
difficult for the public to access information prior to the
permitting process; that EPA failed to provide the
information in an understandable form; and failed to provide
more than a "pro forma" public information hearing on the
day of the hearing.28 However, the court ruled that
EPA did not violate any procedural rules in the permitting
process. Therefore, the court rejected the petitioners'
claims that they were denied an opportunity for meaningful
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participation.
EPA did provide the public with an opportunity to
attend a public information session on the day of the permit
hearing.

Many residents, because of their impoverished

status, were not able to attend the meeting, or were not
able to understand the highly technical documents. This
raises questions about the definition of "meaningful
opportunity. "
Wendell Paris, a resident of Emelle, argues that the
dominance of white control within the local government and
the lack of "informed, active black population in the black
population" set the stage for Chemical Waste Management1s
success in siting the largest hazardous waste facility in
Emelle.29 Robert Bullard supports Paris's conclusion by
arguing that the success of NIMBY movement during the 1980s
caused hazardous waste facilities "follow the path of least
resistance," thus causing them to end up in "poor,
powerless, black communities."30 As white, affluent
neighborhoods become increasingly more successful in
fighting hazardous waste facilities from locating in their
communities, black communities were often targeted as sites
for unwanted land uses.31
Compelling evidence supports the conclusion that the
distributional effects of hazardous policy implementation
unfairly burden those who receive the least benefit. Women,
minorities, and low-income people are typically
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disadvantaged in the current economic system. The Emelle
case supports the argument that low income and minority
citizens are often excluded from the hazardous waste policy
process because they are excluded from positions of power
where decisions are made.

Conclusions
The Technical/Scientific and Public Values Challenge

By bringing private concerns to the public1s attention,
Lois Gibbs effectively challenged the dominant view that
private concerns have no place in the public policy arena.
Through her activism, Gibbs showed that women involved in
local struggles can effectively use their social positions
as women and mothers to link local concerns to national
political issues. Prior to 1976, hazardous waste policy was
not an issue that captured national attention. After Love
Canal, most citizens were aware of the potential threat
waste posed to their communities. The actions of Hooker
Chemical became a symbol of the dangers unethical corporate
practices could wreak on the lives of innocent people. It
became clear that considerations of justice and fairness
needed to be integrated into the policy process. But the
limitations of rationalist epistemologies truncate
possibilities for value discussions within the policy
process because values are not considered valid knowledge.
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The Epistemological Challenge

When hazardous waste struggles are viewed within the
larger context of social and political relationships, women
often develop a critical perspective about the role of
science in government policies. Since science is based on a
rationalist epistemology it explicitly excludes values as a
source of knowledge. Thus, environmental policy discussions
exclude considerations of environmental justice. This raises
important questions about the epistemological presumptions
of separation and connection, objectivity and subjectivity,
reason and emotion.

The Challenge of Citizen Participation

In addition to the epistemological challenge, the
policy process is challenged by differing interpretations of
"meaningful opportunity." Residents of Emelle argued that
they were denied a "meaningful opportunity" to participate
in the process. Had the court found in their favor, a
precedent for finding the EPA guilty of environmental
injustice would have been established. This is because
opportunity to accept or reject a risk is an inportant
component of justice. Citizens, however, are not guaranteed
a right to environmental protection.

The Rights and Responsibilities Challenge

While NEPA clearly specifies responsibilities to
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maintaining the environment, this requirement is not
balanced with the right to a healthful environment.
Residents in Love Canal, New York; Emelle, Alabama; and
Warren County, North Carolina fought for freedom from toxic
contamination. If NEPA guaranteed environmental rights as
was the original intention of the bill's authors, these
cases might not exist today. But this is a matter of much
speculation.
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CHAPTER FOUR

THE CHALLENGE OF PUBLIC PARTICIPATION

In this chapter I examine guidelines for public
participation in environmental programs. These guidelines
apply explicitly to the Resource Conservation and Recovery
Act, the Safe Drinking Water Act, and the Clean Water Act.
While other environmental laws require public participation,
most notably CERCLA or Superfund, the guidelines are
restricted to the laws mentioned above.
While there are many models of public participation, I
examine the traditional, elite model which relies on the
judgment of experts. Within the traditional environmental
paradigm, the dominant belief is that environmental problems
can be managed through industrial reform and State
regulation.

Hence, the National Environmental Policy Act

(NEPA) and the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA)
were created as State administered policies that require a
complex regulatory structure managed by scientific and
technical experts. The regulatory structure is bureaucratic
in the classical Weberian sense1 and based on
instrumentalism, a pragmatic philosophy that maintains

thought is both functional and instrumental in controlling
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and managing environmental problems. Instrumental
rationality is the direct application of instrumentalism.
While the epistemological assunptions of these two models
will be developed more fully in the next chapter, a short
discussion is necessary here in order to introduce the
concepts I will use later.
According to critical theorist Jurgen Habermas,
instrumental rationality is the way of knowing that has
assumed cultural hegemony in Western, capitalist societies
and is a source of "unfreedom. "2 Habermas delineates three
categories of knowledge: empirical-analytical, interpretive
insight, and emancipatory. Emancipatory knowledge, which
empowers people through a process of self-reflection to free
themselves from false consciousness, prejudice, and harmful
ideologies, includes interpretive and emancipatory
knowledge.3 Emancipatory and interpretive knowledge require
a discursive, dialogic process. But the traditional model of
environmental decision making is based on instrumentalism
and logical positivism, or to use Yankelovich's term,
"objectivism." Decisions are often made by individual
decision makers, typically risk professionals, within the
bureaucratic setting, outside the purview of the public.4
Mary Timney Bailey argues when traditional theories and
administrative practices no longer reflect the way the world
is, old methods and models of decision making no longer
apply. The liberal political assumptions of separation and

51

individualism, of instrumental rationality and hierarchy, of
welfare capitalism and the free market are outdated in the
world we inhabit today.5 While these assumptions may have
been useful during the earlier part of the century, they no
longer reflect the way the world operates.

THE TRADITIONAL MODEL AND ITS CRITICS

The traditional model is flawed for a number of
reasons. First of all, the traditional model assumes the
organizational and institutional structures are not
problematic. However, Iris Young argues that organizational
structures can reinforce oppressive practices by overtly or
covertly denying access to some citizens. Issues of power
and access need to be analyzed as possible sources of
exclusion. Young asserts that possibilities for questioning
the underlying social and institutional structures that
cause inaccessibility should be a part of the policy process
when making distributive decisions. This shifts the focus of
analysis from the outcome of distributive decisions to "the
procedural issues of participation and deliberation and
decision making."6
One of the assumptions that underlies organizations
that adhere to the traditional model is that truth can be
scientifically derived.7 Bailey argues that
although science claims to be objective, the Rational
Model, in fact, assumes the existence of a set of
universal values, derived from the cultural norms of a
homogeneous, middle-class European society. The values
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determine the acceptability of solutions to problems
that have been defined in terms of the values. .. .For
maximum efficiency, the model also demands an elite
model of politics and administration...Pluralism, which
implies deviation from elitist cultural norms, can be
tolerated only to the extent that it can be
controlled.8
Second, the traditional model assumes that experts make
the best decisions because of their access to technical
knowledge. Fiorino counters claims that the traditional
model is preferable by arguing that citizens' judgments
about risks are often as sound, if not more sound, than
those of experts.9 The traditional model undermines
democratic principles because decisions are typically made
by individual decision makers without involving the public
in the decision making process.
Third, the assumption that problems occur in isolation
and can be solved without considering the context in which
they occur is problematic if we accept the premise that all
problems are interconnected. A fundamental law of ecology is
that all life is interconnected. If this is true, then
problems do not occur in isolation.
Both Bailey and Fiorino conclude that traditional
models of decision making are inadequate because the
assumptions are outdated. However, these assumptions
continue inform the traditional decision making model
institutionalized in government agencies, including the
Environmental Protection Agency.
Although the problem is not specifically a problem of
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participation, by placing hazardous waste dumps in lowincome neighborhoods citizens often conclude that
environmental policies are not legitimate because they
protect the interests of corporations and not the general
public.10 Hazardous waste facilities are often placed out of
sight of the white, voting, middle-class. This contributes
to the perception that public participation programs are
simply pro forma, public relations "shows" and not real
opportunities for involvement in the policy process.11
Critical theorist Jurgen Habermas argues that when the
legitimacy of the regulatory apparatus is threatened, the
potential for a legitimation crisis is established.12
If Habermas's analysis is correct, then public participation
programs may be used as political tools to create an
illusion of fairness, justice, and equality to prevent the
public from pulling support from the State1s regulatory
apparatus. If we apply this theory to hazardous waste siting
decisions we can speculate that public participation
mechanisms may support the interests of the capitalist class
while disproportionately burdening members of the lower
class. If this application is correct, then current public
participation programs may not provide citizens with a
meaningful, "real" opportunity to participate in the
decision process. If this is true, then the process used to
site the Emelle facility may have been pro forma.
A complete analysis of the traditional decision making
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requires an analysis of the procedures used to make
decisions. Young argues that
decision making issues include not only questions
of who, by virtue of their positions have the
effective freedom or authority to make what
decisions, but also the rules and procedures
according to which decisions are made.13
In the next section I review the procedures for including
the public in the environmental decision making process.
Following the review, I analyze the guidelines for
structural barriers to participation and argue that
structural barriers to participation exist because of
implicit class bias.

Review of Public Participation Guidelines
Covered Activities

Guidelines for public participation programs are
outlined in the Code of Federal Regulations. Activities that
must be open to the public include the issuance of permits
for the operation of hazardous waste treatment and disposal
facilities, permit enforcement, and rulemaking. Government
agencies at the federal, state, interstate and substate
levels are required to develop programs that "encourage and
assist the participation of the public."14

Definition of the Public

The public is defined as "the people as a whole"15 in
keeping with the spirit of NEPA as "a people's policy."
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Specific segments of the population are identified "which
may have a particular interest in a given program or
decision.1,16 This includes private citizens affected by a
decision as well as members of associations, organizations,
professional societies, civic organizations, public
officials, and governmental and educational associations.17

Definition Of Public Participation

Public participation is defined as
that part of the decision-making process
through which responsible officials become
aware of public attitudes by providing arrple
opportunities for interested and affected
parties to communicate their views. Public
participation includes providing access to
the decision-making process, seeking input
from and conducting dialogue with the public,
assimilating public viewpoints and
preferences, and demonstrating that those
preferences have been considered by the
decision-making official. Disagreement on
significant issues is to be expected among
government agencies and the diverse groups
interested in and affected by public policy
issues. Public agencies should encourage full
presentation of issues at an early stage so
that they can be resolved and timely
decisions can be made. In the course of this
process, responsible officials should make
special efforts to encourage and assist
participation by citizens representing
themselves and by others whose resources and
access to decision-making may be relatively
limited.18

Policy Objectives

The specific objectives for the implementation of
public participation programs are outlined in §23.3(c) and
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recapitulate many of the key concepts outlined in the policy
section of §25.3(b). The seven objectives listed are:
(1) To assure that the public has the opportunity to
understand official programs and proposed actions, and that
the government fully considers the public's concern.
(2) To assure that the government does not make any
significant decision on any activity covered by this part
without consulting interested and affected segments of the
public.
(3) To assure that government action is as responsive
as possible to public concerns.
(4) To encourage public involvement in implementing
environmental laws.
(5) To keep the public informed about significant
issues and proposed project or program changes as they
arise.
(6) To foster a spirit of openness and mutual trust
among EPA, States, substate agencies, and the public.
(7) To use all feasible means to create opportunities
for public participation and to stimulate and support
participation.

Minimum Requirements

§25.4 outlines the minimum requirements for EPA, State,
interstate, and substate agencies in the development of
public participation programs. Subsection (a) clearly
specifies that conducting a public information and
participation program is required. Subsection (b) outlines
the "information, notification, and consultation
responsibilities" required by EPA, State, interstate, or
substate agencies responsible for implementing public
participation programs.
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Informational Activities

Agencies are responsible for designing "informational
activities to encourage and facilitate the public's
participation in all significant decisions outlined in §25.2
(a) ."19 It is incumbent upon the agency to provide the
public with "continuing policy, program, and technical
information and assistance" as early as possible in the
decision process. Furthermore, "the social, economic, and
environmental consequences" of an action should be
communicated to the public in informational materials.
Section §25.4(b)3 addresses the availability of plans,
reports, and documents relating to the decision making
process. In order to make information available to the
public, the guidelines indicate that an "agency shall
provide one or more central collections" of pertinent
documents. Furthermore, copying facilities should be located
on the premises where the documents are kept. Sensitivity to
the cost of copying materials is mentioned in this section.
Copying should be made available at a "reasonable" cost.
§25.4(b)4 explicitly addresses the issue of copying
costs. Agencies are required, when possible, to "provide
copies of documents of interest to the public free of
charge."20 This requirement is consistent with the
requirements of §25.3(b) which encourages officials to make
special efforts to accommodate citizens whose income and
access to the decision-making process may be limited.
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Notification Requirements

Agencies are required to maintain a mailing list of
"persons and organizations who have expressed an interest
in, or may, by the nature of their purposes, activities, or
members, be affected by or have an interest in any covered
activity. "21
Public notification requirements are covered in
§25.4(c). Agencies are required to notify both "interested
affected parties and the media in advance of times at which
major decisions not covered by notice requirements for
public meetings and public hearings are being considered."22
Notices should be distributed well in advance of the
proposed agency action in order to allow a minimum of thirty
days for public response. Notices must include the timetable
for a decision, the salient issues involved, the applicable
laws and/or regulations under consideration or which have
bearing on the matter, the location of documents, and the
name of an agency representative to contact for further
information. Additionally, any other relevant public
involvement opportunities must be listed as well.23
Notices for public hearings, however, must be
distributed forty five days prior to the scheduled date of a
hearing unless it is determined by EPA that "there are no
substantial documents which must be reviewed for effective
hearing participation and that there are no complex or
controversial matters to be addressed by the hearing."24
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Public Consultation Mechanisms

The term "public consultation" is defined in §25.4(d)
as "an exchange of views between governmental agencies and
interested or affected persons and organizations.1,25 Three
approaches to public consultation are listed" public
meetings, public hearings, and advisory groups. These three
types of public consultation are considered "formal"
mechanisms. §25.5 defines a hearing as "any non
adjudicatory" meeting. §25.6 defines public meetings as "any
assemblies or gatherings, (such as conferences,
informational seminars, workshops, or other activities)
which are open to the public."
A crucial component of the public consultation
mechanism is the "timely distribution of information." The
guidelines specify that distribution must occur well in
advance of decision-making in order "to allow the agency to
assimilate public views into agency actions."26 Furthermore,
an agency is required to hold a meeting or hearing if it
"determines that there is significant public interest or
that a hearing or meeting would be useful.1,27
§25.5(c) requires that "hearings must be held at times and
places which facilitate attendance by the public."
Particular consideration should be given to evening and
weekends, access to public transportation, and multi-site
meetings if the action affects a large region.
Witnesses should be scheduled before the hearing,
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according to §25.5(d), in order to effectively utilize the
time allotted for all speakers. However, the guidelines
specify that time should be left for unscheduled testimony,
such as questions and answers. This should provide an
opportunity for unscheduled witnesses to come forward during
the hearing, as well as facilitate public discussion.
Hearings should be conducted in a way that does not
"unduly inhibit free expression of views.1,28 It is incumbent
on the agency to inform those in attendance of the issues
involved, the considerations the agency will make regarding
the decision, the tentative decision made by the agency
prior to the hearing, and the particular information
solicited from the public.29
The final formal mechanism available to agencies for
facilitating public participation is advisory groups.
Advisory groups "are intended to assist elected officials or
appointed officials with final decision-making...on
important issues and foster a constructive interchange among
various interests present in the group, and enhance the
prospect of community acceptance of agency action."30 The
advisory group should consist "of substantially equivalent
proportions of (1) private citizens, (2) representatives of
public interest groups, (3) public officials, and (4)
citizens or representatives of organizations with
substantial economic interests in the plan or project."31
The agency is responsible for identifying members of
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the groups listed above for possible membership on the
advisory committee. "Active efforts" to inform citizens and
members of various interest groups are required by the
agency. This may include a variety of outreach efforts,
including contacting individuals and organizations
directly.32
However, if the agency is unable to fairly balance
representation on the advisory committee it must "identify
the causative problem and make additional efforts to
overcome such problems," even if it requires making
"personal contact with prospective participants to invite
their participation.1,33 If an agency cannot meet the
requirements for membership, it is required to contact EPA
for assistance. Furthermore, a list of all advisory group
members must be made available to EPA and the public. It is
incumbent on the agency to provide, as well, a list of its
efforts to comply with the membership requirements.
Additionally, an explanation of the problems which prevented
compliance is required by EPA.34
Less formal public consultation mechanisms include
"review groups, ad hoc committees, task forces, workshops,
seminars and informal personal communications with
individuals and groups."35
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ANALYSIS OF THE GUIDELINES
The Definition Of Public Participation

The public participation process is defined as
"providing access to the decision-making process, seeking
input from and conducting dialogue with the public." Access
denotes having an opportunity to participate. Since access
involves the time and location of meetings some citizens may
be barred from participating by scheduling conflicts. If a
community or neighborhood is low-income or working class a
meeting held during working hours may prevent many people
from participating. Working class and hourly wage earners do
not have the same privileges as white collar professionals
who have more control over their working hours. Blue collar
workers typically cannot take time off from work for
political involvement unless they use sick or 'vacation time.
Low-income mothers may need child care in order to
participate. Furthermore, transportation may be an issue,
especially for residents in rural communities.
Although these may seem to be minor points I believe
they may inhibit participation because of an implicit class
bias. Rosenstone and Hansen argue that " [p]eople who are
educated, efficacious, and socially involved take part in
the activities of government more often than others."36 This
occurs, in part, because better educated individuals have
access to resources that are necessary for participation in
political and public affairs. Rosenstone and Hansen define
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resources as money, time, knowledge, skill, and selfconfidence. Access includes time, location, and the economic
resources necessary to enable participation. Because
affluent individuals are in a position to hire others to
care for their children, clean their houses, and attend to
other details of daily life, they may have more time to
participate in public meetings. Poor individuals, on the
other hand, do not have the same luxury of time because they
are struggling to survive. Thus, a lack of material
resources may prohibit lower income persons from
part icipating.
Although the guidelines state "responsible officials
should make special efforts to encourage and assist
participation by citizens representing themselves and others
whose resources and access may be relatively limited" this
does not guarantee low income persons will be given
assistance to participate. First of all, this statement puts
the burden for providing assistance on responsible
officials. Not all officials are responsible. Second,
"should" is a normative statement, not a requirement. Third,
during the Reagan administration funds to states for public
participation programs were cut which indicates
participation programs are subject to partisan control.37
And finally, special efforts are not defined.
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The People As The Public

Although the guidelines define the public as the
"people as a whole," certain populations are explicitlyidentified as potentially having a special interest in
specific programs or decisions. This includes private
citizens as well as members of professional and civic
organizations, government agencies and educational
institutions, and elected officials.
While it is true that some groups may be more
interested in participating because of an increased sense of
political efficacy, there appears to be an inplicit class
bias in this requirement which may prevent low income,
racial minorities, and women from participating. By making
special efforts to involve established environmental groups,
civic associations, and professional groups, low income
citizens may be excluded. Direct outreach to individuals and
organizations may result in over-representation of white,
middle class individuals either in public meetings,
hearings, or advisory groups.
Active involvement in voluntary organizations and
associations promotes political activism38. Low income
people are generally under represented in professional and
civic organizations and associations, including the
traditional environmental groups. Research indicates that
membership in mainstream environmental groups is primarily
white and middle class. 39 This is because many minorities
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and low income citizens often prefer local, grassroots
movements organized around environmental justice issues.40
Because of the frustration experienced by grassroots
activists in their attempts to communicate with officials,
many low-income women develop alternative policy processes
based on principles of participatory democracy and inclusive
strategies.41

Dialogue and the Decision Making Official

Public participation includes "seeking input from and
conducting dialogue with the public... assimilating public
viewpoints and preferences, and demonstrating that those
preferences have been considered by the decision-making
official." There are several key issues contained in this
statement that need further analysis. First, the term
"dialogue" deserves further consideration. Dialogue is a
process of communication, usually a conversation, where
"ideas and opinions are exchanged in order to reach an
amicable or agreeable settlement. 42
According to this definition dialogue assumes a nonadversarial process. Implicit in this definition is the
assumption that parties involved in a dialogue will engage
in the process with the intention of reaching agreement.
However, the guidelines state that "[d] isagreement on
significant issues is to be expected among government
agencies and the diverse groups interested in and affected
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by public policy issues." Because this model is founded on
the assumption that disagreement can be expected, the
process is implicitly informed by "a competitive model that
locates the authority in the rational process of
individuals."43 This contradicts the definition of dialogue
which assumes a non-adversarial process. Basing procedures
on the adversarial argumentative style as the preferred mode
of public discussion may prevent "tacit and more grounded
forms of knowledge" from emerging in the policy process.44
This point is important because this may constitute a form
of domination which may inhibit the expression of
emancipatory knowledge. Some cultural groups prefer
narrative or storytelling as ways of conveying knowledge
instead of argumentative and confrontational styles.45
Typically low-income women represent the community
while middle class white men represent government and
industry. William Freudenburg and Susan Pastor suggest that
"unseen assumptions about masculinity and femininity may
play an important part in NIMBY/LULU debates."46 They argue
that local leaders of grassroots groups who are usually
women are often perceived as "irrational, emotional, or illinformed" by government and industry officials.
Steven Rosenstone and John Hansen argue that gender,
race, and language may impede political participation.47
Women and Blacks often experience an "ascriptive barrier"
when attempting to communicate with white, male public
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officials.48 This may reflect "implicit stereotyping" by
"policy spokesperson and scientists" who are "overwhelmingly
men.1,49
Although the guidelines require that hearings be
conducted in a manner that is conducive to public
participation, hearings and public meetings can be
intimidating to some women and racial minorities because of
inplicit stereotyping and the "ascriptive barrier" described
above. Typically witnesses come forward and address a panel
of officials from a podium with a microphone in a large room
full of people. For someone who has never experienced this
type of public presentation, or who lacks the self
confidence necessary to present their point of view, the
hearing may present a formidable obstacle to participation.
The way in which a meeting or hearing is structured
(formal vs. informal) and the leadership style of the
facilitator may impact the participation process. While the
guidelines specify that meetings should not be conducted in
a way to inhibit the free expression of views and values,
the process may implicitly inhibit citizen's voices.
Facilitators may enhance or inhibit participation
depending on the manner they use to conduct meetings or
hearings. The use of a dialogic, narrative style instead of
an argumentative, adversarial style may enhance
participation and facilitate the discussion of public
values.
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Furthermore, dialogue assumes that people have the
necessary skills to engage in public deliberation. Because
these skills are usually refined through the process of
higher education, many low income people do not have the
requisite thinking and verbal skills to effectively
participate in public discussion. Thus, opportunities for
enhancing citizen's political capacities should be a primary
corrponent of an environmental justice strategy.50
Another aspect of access involves the assumption that
most people are literate and speak English. A California
court recently ruled that many Hispanic residents of
Kettleman, California were denied access to the public
participation process under RCRA because public officials
failed to translate documents into Spanish.51
Finally, the guidelines imply that the "decision maker"
has the final say on what decision will be implemented.
Although the public should have an opportunity to have input
into the decision process, express their preferences and
views, the ultimate authority rests with the decision maker.
Typically the decision maker is the government official
responsible for state or federal environmental protection
agencies.
This is problematic for two reasons. First of all, by
relying on an individual decision maker who must assimilate
and demonstrate s/he has considered public preferences, a
power differential exists between the decision making
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official and the public. The decision maker, although
informed by the public, appears to act autonomously in the
final analysis when determining which decision is best. By
relying on an individual decision maker to make the best
decision, the guidelines assume that the liberal political
ideals of autonomy, independence, and separation are
normative. These assumptions will be more fully explored in
the next chapter.
Second, most environmental decisions are based on some
variant of positivist theory. Positivism is anti-democratic
because of the implicit assumption that once the individual
analyst or decision maker discovers and knows the facts
about the environment, "decisions will be almost
automatic."52 If this is true, then public participation
mechanisms may not be intended as truly public deliberative
processes, but rather public relations events to maintain
loyalty to the State to avert a mass uprising.

Political Capacity

According to political scientists Steven Rosenstone and
John Hansen, and sociologist Robert Bullard, personal
competence (or self-confidence) is a key determinant in
political participation. Because members of marginalized
groups, especially women, racial and ethnic minorities, and
members of lower economic classes often suffer from
"internalized oppression,1,53 the probability of public
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involvement is less than for those individuals who have a
sense of personal competence.
Berry, Portney, and Thomsen concur with this conclusion
but expand the definition of efficacy to include a notion
they call "capacity." Political capacity is defined as "the
overall ability of an individual to take part in the
political process."54 While efficacy usually implies a form
of political self-esteem, capacity involves a broader range
of dimensions than traditional theories of efficacy. These
dimensions include
a practical dimension (the knowledge to know
how to participate), a psychological
dimension (the belief that one can influence
the system), and an experiential dimension
(the drawing of lessons from activity in
politics that makes one believe it is worth
participating) .55
Citizens need to know how to participate, know that
their participation matters, and know about their
participation by experiencing the process. However, not all
citizens have the practical knowledge to know how to access
the participation process, or have the self-confidence to
know that their participation can make a difference. Without
the requisite practical knowledge, citizens cannot gain
knowledge about the worth of their experience. Thus,
material barriers may seriously inpact political capacity.
Berry, Portney, and Thomsen conclude that participation
in face-to-face participation activities is positively
correlated with increased knowledge about how to access
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government services. Furthermore, as citizens develop a
sense of empowerment in the psychological dimension, they
are more likely to participate in face-to-face political
activity. This sense of empowerment increases citizen's
beliefs about their own effectiveness in influencing local
government. However, the authors conclude that increases in
political capacity are more pronounced, especially for lower
socio-economic individuals, when a participation program is
part of a citywide context.

Conclusions

In this chapter I have discussed the challenge of
citizen participation by analyzing the guidelines for public
participation programs in hazardous waste policy. I have
argued that material/structural barriers may prevent many
low-income and women from participating in the policy
process. While procedural reform may alleviate some of the
barriers to participation, this conclusion is tentatively
advanced. The solution to the citizen participation
challenge may require an emancipatory decision making
process that incorporates other forms of knowledge,
including emancipatory and interpretive knowledge. This
knowledge, however, should not supplant scientific/analytic
knowledge. In the next chapter I explore the epistemological
challenge.
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CHAPTER FIVE

THE EPISTEMOLOGICAL CHALLENGE

Beyond defining environmentalism in a more inclusive
way, emancipatory environmentalism brings epistemological
issues to the forefront for critical analysis. Therefore, an
analysis of the traditional and emancipatory environmental
paradigms would be incomplete without uncovering their
epistemological foundations. In this chapter I address the
epistemological challenge, and argue that alternative forms
of knowledge should be included in the decision making
process. I discuss postmodern theories of alternative
"epistemes," critiques of science, and discuss objectivist
and standpoint epistemological and moral theories. I argue
that the disinterested, detached position knowers assume in
objectivist epistemology is similar to the moral standpoint
required by Kantian ethics. This position may cause morally
exclusive thinking. In contrast to the objectivist
standpoint, feminist theorists have developed an alternative
epistemological theory called "standpoint epistemology." I
discuss standpoint epistemology and alternative moral
theories.
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The Epistemological Barrier

An "epistemological barrier" exists between experts and
the lay public that prevents many citizens from
participating in the decision making process.1 One of the
consequences of this epistemological barrier is that many
citizens develop a distrust of experts.2 Many hazardous
waste siting controversies have been exacerbated by the
seeming inability of experts to bridge the gap between their
specialized scientific/technological knowledge and other
forms of knowledge. These other forms of knowledge include
what Michael Foucault calls "subjugated knowledges."3
Subjugated knowledges are thus those blocks
of historical knowledge which were present
but disguised within the body of
functionalist and systematizing theory and
which criticism - which obviously draws upon
scholarship - has been able to reveal.4
In addition, Foucault argues that these knowledges have been
placed low on the hierarchy of knowledge and disqualified as
legitimate. He calls these subjugated knowledges "popular
knowledge" which are not to be confused with common sense.
Instead, subjugated knowledges represent "a particular,
local, regional knowledge, a differential knowledge
incapable of unanimity.1,5
Numerous scholars describe the dominant epistemology,
or "episteme" as objectivist, technicist,
technical/analytical and technocratic.6 Despite the
dominance of this epistemology other forms of knowledge,

including the subjugated knowledges described by Foucault
and the interpretive and emancipatory forms of knowledge
discussed by Habermas, exist as alternative epistemes. These
"alternative epistemes are a possible source of escape from
domination.1,7 But as Foucault notes, they may be uncovered
through a process of deconstructing accepted ways of
knowing. In the case of environmental policy, this involves
a deconstruction of the objectivist/technicist episteme.
This does not mean scientific and technical knowledge is not
important in the hazardous waste policy process. The point
is that we should integrate other forms of knowledge into to
the decision matrix. Other ways of knowing include
interpretive and emancipatory knowledge including values,
conceptions of justice, ethics, and other non-verifiable
ways of knowing.8 Thus, the incorporation of alternative
forms of knowledge may provide the balance of technical and
value concerns intended by the authors of NEPA.
Benjamin Goldman supports this conclusion and argues
that environmental injustice is caused, in part, by the
limits of scientific positivism. In a report prepared for
the National Wildlife Federation, Goldman makes states his
conclusion clearly:
[c] oncem for environmental justice means
that the kinds of scientific data and
uncertainty involved in all types of
environmental analysis must be viewed within
the context of varying perceptions and
values. While traditional scientific methods
strive for objective results that can pass
accepted standards of scientific proof, the
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goals of fairness and justice that are
demanded by environmental justice advocates
are inherently subjective, multifaceted, and
vary from case to case. This challenge to
scientific positivism is part of the long
term trend of increasingly widespread public
distrust of scientific and institutional
authority.9
Goldman argues that the problem cannot be remedied by
the current risk methodologies used by EPA. This is because
traditional scientific positivism separates facts from
values. Facts are considered knowledge while values and
judgments are not. As we saw in Chapter Two, community
residents often discuss values while technical experts
discuss facts. What Goldman recognizes is that environmental
justice requires an alternative form of decision making that
can accommodate public deliberation about justice and
equity. In the next section we shall see that the
traditional rational decision model is limited in it's
ability to accommodate concerns about justice.
Research methodologies that exclude explicit values
discussions, argues Beverly Wright, cause many community
residents to conclude that experts and researchers cannot be
trusted because they fail to establish "a human relationship
with their study group. "10 Wright assumes that the
discussion of values may strengthen the expert-citizen
relationship. Margot Garcia supports this conclusion by
stating that "[b]uilding support comes from understanding
the local community and responding to their world view."11
In order to build bridges between scientific expertise and
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subjugated knowledges, Wright concludes "[w]e must foster
mutual respect for different ways of knowing."12 If Wright's
conclusion is correct, then fostering respect for different
ways of knowing and developing inclusive strategies in
environmental decision making should be a priority for EPA.
Before inclusive strategies can be developed, however, the
underlying ethical and epistemological assumptions of
objectivism and standpoint theories will be critically
examined.

Objectivist Epistemology

Daniel Yankelovich, author of Coming to Public
Judgment. argues that a Culture of Technical Control
dominates the public realm, thus "undermining the country's
ability to reach agreement between the public and experts on
the serious problems that beset society.1,13 The Culture of
Technical Control, according to Yankelovich, operates from
many assumptions. While these assumptions are too lengthy to
list here, several are relevant to the discussion and will
be mentioned.
These assumptions are as follows: policy decisions
require a high degree of specialized knowledge and skill.
Only experts possess this knowledge. The American public
lacks the relevant knowledge to participate in policy
decisions and are concerned with economic self-interest, if
they are interested at all. On issues that require public
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involvement, such as hazardous waste and other environmental
issues, it is assumed that "public education" programs can
facilitate public understanding.14
Yankelovich argues that the objectivist epistemology is
the dominant episteme in the Culture of Technical Control.
One of the characteristics of objectivist epistemology is
the separation of facts from values. Facts are considered
genuine knowledge while value judgments are considered
emotional responses to conditions of life that cannot be
verified as truths. To count as objective knowledge, claims
must be verifiable by scientific methods. It is not possible
to establish the truth validity of a -value judgment.15
Emotions and values have long been considered subversive in
the Western tradition and associated with women and members
of non-dominant groups.16
Values and emotions are considered invalid ways of
knowing within the dominant epistemological paradigm based
on rationalism (pure reason and logic) and empiricism
(observation by experience). One of the key differences
between rationalist and empiricist epistemologies is in the
function and value of the deductive as opposed to the
inductive inferential process. Within the rationalist
epistemological paradigm knowledge is constructed using
principles of formal logic and mathematics, from first
principles which are known to be true a priori, or before
experience. Formal logic and mathematics are deductive.
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Thus, if the premises are true the conclusion has to be
true. Deductive arguments are valid arguments.
Inductive arguments are considered cogent if the
premises are acceptable. Inductive arguments require that
judgment be exercised in the inferential process. The
premises are carefully evaluated and weighed globally
against other knowledge claims. The inductive process is a
deliberative process of evaluating and questioning premises.
It is at this point in the inferential process that
judgment is exercised. One of the assumptions of the Culture
of Technical Control is that citizens do not have the
required knowledge to participate in policy decisions. While
it may be true that citizens do not have access to the same
facts as experts, if values were considered valid knowledge,
then the conclusion that citizens do not have adequate
knowledge to participate in the decision making process
would be invalid.
Value judgments, however, cannot be verified through
"intersubjective verifiability, 1,17 a key requirement of
objectivism. This aspect of objectivity specifies that one
can obtain more evidence for a statement and, hence put the
claim on more solid epistemological ground by asking others
what they observe and experience under conditions similar to
the conditions under which the original observation is made.
If an observer observes the same set of premises as the
original observer, then those observations should lead to
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the same conclusion. Since value neutrality fulfills one of
the aspects of objectivity within the objectivist paradigm,
it is assumed that evaluation of premises does not occur in
the inferential process since all premises lead to the same
conclusion if we accept them as verifiable, hence empirical
facts. But the inferential process is not value free. The
very process of accepting some premises and rejecting others
involves making value judgments.
Reason and emotions, mind and body, facts and values,
public and private, theory and practice are separated into
two distinct realms within the modem worldview that informs
the traditional decision making model.18 This theory
provides the foundations for the epistemological assumptions
of positivism and neo-positivism that inform liberal
political theory.19 Basic to liberal political philosophy is
the assumption that human beings are morally and
epistemologically separate from one another.20 Within
liberalism it is assumed that humans make moral decisions
and create knowledge as separate and autonomous individuals.
This assumption influences both epistemological and moral
standpoints and may not seem problematic if we accept the
basic premises of separation and autonomy as normative. But
if we question the validity of separation and autonomy as
normative moral and epistemological standpoints,

the

objectivist paradigm begins to crumble.
The detached standpoint required by objectivist
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epistemology shares many similarities with the objectivist
standpoint found in the ethical theory of Immanuel Kant.
In the next section, I discuss the objective moral
standpoint.

Kant and the Objective Standpoint

Kant1s ethical theory of the categorical imperative
provides the basis for deonotological, or rule-based ethics.
In A Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals. Kant argues
that an objective standpoint is necessary in developing
moral principles. Ethics, according to Kant, cannot be based
on emotions because of their subjective contingency.
Autonomous reason, according to Kant, provides a basis for
supreme morality. Kant calls objective principles "commands
of reason" and their formulas imperatives. An imperative can
command hypothetically or categorically. Hypothetical
imperatives guide actions that lead a desired end.
Categorical imperatives are universal commands that guide
actions that are morally necessary irrespective of one's
goals or desired ends. According to this theory, moral
decisions should be made "as if" whatever moral decision we
make would become a universal law. Thus, Kant's theory is a
universalizing theory that strives for moral absolutes.21
There are several problems with Kant's theory. First of
all, the standpoint from which the moral agent makes moral
decisions is free from the context of particular historical,

social, and cultural conditions. Thus, this objectivist
standpoint requires that principles guiding moral and
ethical decision making be developed from an impartial point
outside the social context. This is often referred to as the
"Archimedean standpoint" which is the goal of positivism and
deonotological moral theory. The assumption here is that all
individuals will reason from the same standpoint. Thus,
Kantian morality assumes moral reasoning occurs from an
abstract, impartial standpoint free from the particular and
subjective contingencies of social and historical context.
The second area where Kant's theory is problematic is
with the role of feelings and emotions in moral decision
making. Kant believes human feelings are inferior to reason
because feelings are subjectively contingent. Kant argues
that emotions belong to the sensible world while reason
belongs to the intelligible world. Emotions allow us to
"know objects only as they affect ourselves."22Thus,
feelings allow us to know how things appear, not as they are
as things in themselves. Implicit in this statement is that
emotions cannot be considered valid knowledge.
Freedom, according to Kant, can only come from being
independent of the vagaries of the sensible world which
includes feelings and emotions. Freedom is thus associated
with reason. Because emotions and feelings are variable,
they cannot be verified and are not considered valid grounds
for making moral decisions. According to Kant, moral
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decisions are made by reasoning.
The objective moral standpoint required by Kantian
ethics has been considered normative by social
psychologists. Lawrence Kohlberg concluded that the
disinterested standpoint was normative after conducting
research on the moral development of male college students
at Harvard. Kohlberg argued that the highest stage of moral
development occurs when a moral agent makes decisions
according to a set of rules. This moral standpoint assumes
the moral agent is autonomous and impartial, not subject to
the influences of emotions, values, or subjectively
contingent conditions.23 The moral actor applies universal
rules without any consideration of the nuances of the
situation. As we saw earlier, Goldman argues that a
requirement of environmental justice is that the decision
making process be a subjective and multi-varied process.
This requires a different moral and epistemological
standpoint than that required by objectivist epistemology
and deontological ethics.
The problem, however, is not with the standpoints, per
se, but with the fact that they are considered normative.
Women and people of color often make moral decisions and
create knowledge from another standpoint, as we shall see in
the next section.
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Standpoint Epistemology

Feminist theories of standpoint epistemology are
premised on the belief that knowledge is socially
constructed and is informed by one's position in society.24
According to this theory, gender, social class, everyday
experience, and history influence knowledge construction.
This theory of knowledge is influenced by Marx's theory of
historical materialism. Standpoint theory posits that
everyday experiences have political consequences.
The premises of standpoint epistemology are:
1. One's material life structures and limits
one's understanding of life.
2. Members of more powerful and less
powerful groups will potentially have
inverted or opposed understandings of the
world.
3. Dominant group view will be 'partial
and perverse' in contrast to the subordinate
groups view, which is potentially more
complete.
4. Less powerful groups standpoint has
to be developed through education, presumably
consciousness raising, or the disadvantaged
are likely to accept their society's dominant
worldview.25
The development of "conscientizagao" or critical
consciousness is an important aspect of standpoint theory.26
From a critically conscious standpoint, an individual can
perceive contradictions inherent in political, social, and
economic relationships. If Foucault is correct, the presence
of subjugated knowledges emerge through the process of
critical social analysis. Because knowledge is created
through experiences that are shaped by social, cultural, and
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political institutions, the knowledge that comes from one's
standpoint is potentially emancipatory knowledge. The
purpose of emancipatory knowledge, according to Habermas, is
"to make people free, to emancipate them mentally from false
forms of consciousness, ideology, prejudices, and mental
coercion."27 This "critical consciousness" occurs at a point
of epistemological development called "constructed
knowing.1,28
Research by feminist psychologists indicate that this
epistemological standpoint is significant for women for
several reasons. Questioning and problem solving are
integral components of knowledge development at this point
because knowers at this stage of epistemological development
often question the status quo and develop radical political
critiques of social conditions.29 Research by Celene Krauss
and Andrew Szasz indicates that women who become involved in
toxic struggles are often politically transformed by their
experiences.
At the position of constructed knowing, knowers move
beyond "either/or" or exclusionary thinking. Thinking
exclusively can lead to exclusive actions. Exclusive
thinking has political consequences because' it can lead to
incoirplete social analysis resulting in poor social policy
"that reproduces, rather than solves, social problems."30
By "shifting the center" of knowledge from the perspective
of dominant groups to oppressed groups our thinking is
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changed from being "exclusive" to "inclusive."
Exclusive thinking has moral as well as epistemological
consequences. Susan Opotow describes morally exclusive
actions as occurring "when individuals or groups are
perceived as outside the boundary in which moral values,
rules, and considerations of fairness apply.1,31 In contrast
to moral exclusion, she refers to moral inclusion as
occurring in
relationships in which the parties are
approximately equal, the potential for
reciprocity exists, and both parties are
entitled to fair processes and some share of
community resources.
Morally inclusive and exclusive thinking are important
to this discussion because of the standpoint each position
irrplies. A morally exclusive standpoint is one in which the
knower assumes a disinterested or inpartial position, thus
enabling him or her to exclude individuals, groups, or non
human nature from moral consideration. This is the
standpoint required by objectivist epistemology. By
developing a moral boundary that excludes some groups from
consideration, it is easier to implement unjust policies.
Thus, the inpartial, disinterested epistemological and moral
standpoint required by objectivist epistemology may actually
be a requirement for success in an advanced capitalist
society. If this is true, then this moral and
epistemological standpoint is a social, historical, and
cultural construction, not a universal condition of moral
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maturity. It may be normative, but it may not be normal.
Morally inclusive thinking requires reciprocity,
equality, fairness, and connection. Moral decisions are thus
made from a situated standpoint. In the next section I
discuss the situated moral standpoint.

The Situated Moral Standpoint

Feminist moral philosophers and ethicists have raised
several criticism of traditional ethical theories, including
deontological ethics.32 Feminists question the norms of
rationality, universality, impartiality, and abstraction.
While there is much debate in feminist circles about what
constitutes feminist ethics, it appears that generally
feminists argue for a morality that values particularity,
emotions, partiality, and actual vs. hypothetical
situations.33 Emphasis is placed on our responsibilities to
relationships instead of on the application of rules. Since
relationships are valued, moral reasoning often takes place
through a discursive, dialogic process which contrasts with
the "monologic" moral reasoning required by Kantian
ethics.34
Joan Tronto argues that since the eighteenth century
the moral point of view has become a standpoint of
"disinterested and disengaged moral actors.1,35 Prior to that
time, the situated moral standpoint was once an integral
part of community life. When the disinterested standpoint

became the norm, morality came to exist in an abstract world
beyond home and community. Although local variations in
moral decision making were once considered normative, as a
consequence of the universalization of morality, Tronto
argues, "local variations in moral decision-making were
viewed as inferior to depersonalized rational thought."36
Thus, the engaged, contextual moral standpoint, influenced
by local knowledge, habits, and customs was replaced by a
standpoint of the disengaged, depersonalized rationality of
Kantian ethics. Tronto argues that the engaged, contextual
moral standpoint has historically been found in those groups
who care for, care about, and take care of others. The work
of Cortese and Gilligan support her conclusion.
Caring is defined as "a species activity that includes
everything we do to maintain, continue, and repair 'our
world' so we can live in it as well as possible. That world
includes our bodies, our selves, and our environment."37
Caring work is divided along gender, racial, and socio
economic lines. The context of caring work is informed by
the feelings and emotions of those engaged in the caring
activity. Thus, caring activity requires a situated
standpoint. But since emotions are considered inferior to
reason, the situated moral standpoint has been marginalized
as well as the people who typically adopt this moral
standpoint: women and people of color.
Critical theorist Jurgen Habermas has written

extensively on the role of discourse in moral reasoning.
Habermas calls this "discursive ethics" and argues that
"only in a discursive context can moral capacities develop
fully.1,38 Because moral capacities develop more fully within
a discursive context, Habermas proposes a seventh stage of
moral development that goes beyond the Kantian stage of
deontological ethics standpoint of moral reasoning from an
abstract, unsituated position. Habermas proposes a seventh
stage of moral development based on an "ideal speech
situation" free from domination. Discursive ethics are
dialogical and assume that discussions about needs and
interests will take place by historically and socially
situated individuals. The way in which values and
assumptions are made explicit is through a discursive
process in a situated, relational, context. Thus, Habermas's
theory of a communicative ethic may foster morally inclusive
thinking since morally inclusive thinking requires
reciprocity, equality, and fairness which occurs in a
relational context between individuals who are historically,
socially, and culturally situated.
According to Lorraine Code, this epistemic context is
best captured in a narrative style.39 The integration of
emotions are integral because through the narrative process
of telling our stories we come to understand others. If
understanding is important in the facility siting process,
as stated by the guidelines, then this may be best
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accomplished by a narrative process that incorporates
interpretive and emancipatory knowledge. But both of these
forms of knowledge assume a situated standpoint. Similar to
the epistemological and moral standpoint of objectivism, the
situated standpoint has both epistemological and moral
implications.
Social psychologists working in the area of moral
cognition provide support for Tronto's conclusion that a
caring, connected moral standpoint is not, in fact, inferior
to the Kantian standpoint. Carol Gilligan and Anthony
Cortese discuss the importance of the contextual, relational
approach to moral decision-making.
Gilligan discovered that a different moral voice often
emerges when women make moral decisions. This "ethic of
care" occurs within the context of relationships, in
contrast to the inpersonal application of deontological or
rule-based ethics. Because moral problems are problems of
human relations, Gilligan concludes that "relationship
requires connection" and "depends not only on the capacity
or the ability to listen to others and learn their language
or take their point of view, but also on having a voice and
having a language."40 I believe Gilligan means women must
feel free to speak the language of emotions.
As I argued in the last chapter, women are often
frustrated in their attempts to communicate with technical
experts. While women and people of color approach toxics
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issues from a perspective of care, experts approach the
situation from a detached standpoint because this is
considered the norm. Furthermore, experts often stereotype
both women and people of color as emotional or hysterical.
Consequently, the ability to understand the perspectives,
interests, values, and world views of community members is
truncated by the requirements of objectivism and
stereotyping. As I noted earlier, overcoming this challenge
requires building trust. Trust and justice require a
relational, situated, and caring context for making
decisions.
Cortese studied the moral decision-making of minority
groups and argues that "relationships provide the context
and basis for any type of justice, any code of moral
principles for which we live."41 Although justice is
something we may understand as a concept, it is through the
practice of justice that we become moral. And Cortese
concludes that "if we have no deep sense of relationship, we
may have a conceptualization of the highest level of
justice, but we will not be moral."42 If Cortese is correct,
then environmental justice may require that we adopt a
situated moral standpoint when making environmental
decisions.

Conclusions

In this chapter I argued that the dominance of the
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objectivist epistemology and the Kantian moral standpoint
present challenges which must be overcome if we are to
achieve the goal of an environmentally just decision making
process. By integrating the subjugated knowledges of local
citizens into the decision making process in substantive
ways, the epistemological challenge may be overcome. This
may require more than mere procedural reform of the
guidelines for public participation. While changing
procedures may facilitate positive changes, other challenges
must be met. In the next chapter, I discuss the public
values challenge.
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CHAPTER SIX

THE TECHNICAL CONSIDERATIONS AND PUBLIC VALUES CHALLENGE:
DEFINING ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE

Although environmental justice is an important
principle, recent debates between environmental justice
advocates and EPA officials skirted philosophical
discussion. Consequently, environmental justice has a
variety of meanings depending on the context of discussion.
The failure to explicitly discuss environmental justice may
exacerbate the problem of environmental injustice because
environmental justice has a variety of meanings depending on
the context of discussion.
In this chapter I discuss the conceptions of justice
that represent the EPA and environmental justice advocates.
I argue that the EPA position is informed by the objectivist
moral and epistemological assuirptions discussed in the last
chapter. The environmental justice position incorporates
standpoint moral and epistemological theories. The best
articulation of this position can be found in the Seventeen
Principles of Environmental Justice.
First, I explore the history of the debates between EPA
and environmental justice advocates. I then discuss the EPA
position and argue that the Kantian-Rawlsian standpoint
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implicitly informs this position. Second, I discuss and
analyze the Seventeen Principles of Environmental Justice.

The EPA Position

In January, 1990 a conference on race and the
environment was held at the University of Michigan, Ann
Arbor. A coalition of scholar-activists, 'the Michigan
Coalition,1 emerged from the conference. The newly-formed
coalition sent memos to Louis Sullivan, Department of Health
and Human Services; William Reilly, Environmental Protection
Agency; and Michael Deland, Council on Environmental
Quality. The memos expressed concern over what the Coalition
viewed as disparate inpacts experienced by low-income and
minority communities in the placement of polluting
facilities. Other state and federal government officials
received copies of the memo, including the Congressional
Black Caucus.2 The Michigan Coalition requested meetings
with agency officials to discuss various dimensions of the
environmental problem.3
In response to the demands made by the Coalition, an
entire issue of the EPA Journal was devoted to the topic. In
the journal, William Reilly framed the issue as an
environmental equity issue.
environmental equity means fairness. It speaks to the
impartiality that should guide the application of laws
designed to protect the health of human beings and the
productivity of ecological systems on which all human
activity depends.4
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On September 13, 1991 members of the Michigan Coalition
met with then EPA Administrator, William Reilly. The meeting
was held in response to the memos sent to Reilly. In order
to determine if the allegations of environmental racism made
by the Coalition were valid, William Reilly formed "an
internal workgroup to study and report to him on the issues
raised at the Michigan conference."5
Comprised of forty professional EPA errployees, the
purpose of the workgroup was to investigate the charges that
EPA's rules were applied unfairly in certain communities and
to make recommendations to Reilly on how to remedy the
situation.6 The workgroup's report, Environmental Equity:
Reducing Risk For All Communities, was released internally
early in 1992. The public, however, did not have access to
the report until June, 1992.
While the Environmental Equity report acknowledged that
differences in exposure to environmental risks are real, the
Workgroup attributed the differences to "historical patterns
of commerce, geography, state and local land use decisions
and other factors that affect where people live and work."7
The group could find no irrefutable empirical evidence to
support claims made by activists that minority communities
were targeted for unwanted facilities. Instead of framing
the issue as a justice issue, the Workgroup followed
Reilly's definition of the problem as "equity."
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The rationale given for choosing the term "equity
instead of "justice" was
because it [environmental equity] most
readily lends itself to scientific risk
analysis. The distribution of environmental
risks is often measurable and quantifiable.
The Agency can act on inequities based on
scientific data. Evaluating the existence of
injustice and racism is more difficult
because they take into account socioeconomic
factors in addition to the distribution of
environmental benefits that are beyond the
scope of this report.8
The Equity Workgroup thus viewed environmental equity as
quantifiable using scientific risk analytic methods. These
methods are informed by the objectivist epistemology
discussed in the last chapter. However, this methodology is
limited because it does not incorporate values into the
decision process except at the point where inferences are
made. The public is not included in the decision process at
the point where inferences are made. Furthermore, values
cannot be quantified.
Rather than discussing various conceptions of justice
and agreeing on principles of environmental justice to guide
the Environmental Protection Agency, the Workgroup decided
against adopting a single philosophy of justice or equity.9
While Reilly called for the impartial application of
rules in order to remedy the equity problem, former EPA
Administrator William Ruckelshaus argued in an article
published in 1985, that "the values and assumptions that
underlie those [environmental] decisions must be made
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manifest."10 But, this is a limitation of the traditional
decision making model as was discussed in Chapter Four.
Modem welfare economic theory provides the basis for
the traditional model of decision making. Within this
paradigm
individual decision makers - whether a single
manager, an agency, or a nation-state - will
make decisions that maximize their own
welfare. Self-interest, narrowly defined,
produces the best decisions and, added
together, all self-interested decisions
result in the maximum welfare for the entire
society11.
The traditional model is informed by utilitarian
theory12 which assumes that achieving maximum welfare for
the entire society usually involves disproportionately
burdening a minority of the population. Utilitarians justify
the imposition of a greater risk burden on one group if the
inposition maximizes benefits for a larger group. However,
moral questions arise when imposing burdens onto a group.
Were they given an opportunity to participate in a
substantive and meaningful way in the decision process?13 In
Chapter Four I argued that the public participation
guidelines exclude many citizens from the process because of
structural barriers. The Emelle case, discussed in Chapter
Three, supports the conclusion that without a real and
meaningful opportunity to participate, the inposition of
hazardous waste is thus immoral and unjust.
Both the Emelle case and the Love Canal case show that
decisions made from a self-interested position do not
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necessarily contribute to the well-being of the entire
society. As Bailey notes, externalities14 are generally
ignored when using the traditional model because they occur
outside the frame of reference of the decision maker. When
using this model as the basis for making environmental
decisions, the negative costs imposed on a community when a
policy is implemented may not be calculated into the
decision matrix. If the social costs of a decision are not
considered and the decision has negative impacts, then
questions of fairness and justice arise. However, within the
traditional model " [s]ocial equity is a fundamentally
different goal, and it is an anomaly unless it can be shown
to be cost-benefit efficient."15 Thus, the traditional model
is not designed to consider questions of fairness or
justice.

Rawlsian Justice

The position taken by the EPA under William Reilly
share some similarities with the welfare liberal conception
of justice. This theory of justice was developed by John
Rawls in his book A Theory of Justice published in 1971.16
The basis of Rawls' is referred to as "contractual
fairness."17 It is anti-utilitarian.18 Rawls argues that fair
distribution in economic opportunities and social conditions
should be based on "justice as fairness".19 Distribution of
benefits are fair if principles of justice are chosen behind
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a "veil of ignorance" from an "original position" where all
participants are equal. Rawls describes the original
position "as a purely hypothetical situation characterized
so as to lead to a certain conception of justice."20 In the
original position, a person does not know his/her race,
class or gender, what position in society s/he holds, or
what talents and abilities s/he possesses because the "veil
of ignorance" prevents them from a subjective perspective.
It is only in this position, Rawls argues, that a fair
conception of justice can be agreed upon by the members of
society.
Rawls was influenced by Immanuel Kant. In Chapter Five
I discussed Kant's categorical imperative in more detail.
Since it provides the basis for Rawls's theory of justice, I
will briefly review the key points. Kant argued that humans
should act rationally when making moral decisions.
Rationality, from the Kantian perspective, requires the
moral agent to assume an objective, disinterested,
autonomous standpoint. From this standpoint, moral decisions
are made based on a principle of impartiality. According to
Rawls's theory moral decisions are made behind a "veil of
ignorance." Behind this veil "all will reason from identical
assumptions and the same universal point of view" as
"rational and disinterested persons" not taking an interest
in one another's interests."21
Critical theorists, influenced by the work of
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intellectuals from the Frankfurt School, argue that "there
is no such thing as an objectively neutral or disinterested
perspective."22 As we saw in the last chapter values and
assumptions are made explicit is through a discursive
process.
Current participation procedures and the impartial
application of rules advocated by Reilly truncate the
possibilities for a truly discursive, deliberative process
were public values can be discovered. This is because of the
limitations of the methodologies used by EPA, the processes
used to make decisions, and more fundamentally, the
epistemological and moral standpoints these methodologies
and procedures require.
In the last chapter I discussed the positions of
environmental justice advocates who argue that environmental
justice requires a subjective, contextual approach. Current
debates in moral theory revolve around the "care" versus
"rule" orientation of the Rawlsian theory of justice. In the
next section I will examine the Seventeen Principles of
Environmental Justice and present arguments that justice
requires a

moral standpoint of care.

The Seventeen Principles Of Environmental Justice

The First People of Color Leadership Conference was
held in Washington D.C. in October 1991. The conference drew
participants from all over the country. Seventeen Principles
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of Environmental Justice emerged from the conference (See
Appendix A) . The principles outline the basic tenets of the
emerging emancipatory environmentalism from the perspectives
of environmental justice advocates.
Under the sponsorship of the United Church of Christ,
the Michigan Coalition organized another conference held
during October 1991. The First National People of Color
Environmental Leadership Conference was held in Washington,
D.C. Seventeen Principles of Environmental Justice were
adopted by participants at the First People of Color
Leadership Conference. These principles articulate the basic
tenets of the emerging emancipatory environmentalism from
the perspectives of environmental justice advocates (see
Appendix).
Themes from the Seventeen Principles of Environmental
Justice include the spiritual connection and interdependence
of all peoples to the Earth; the importance of sustainable
development; respect and justice for all peoples in public
policies; protection from nuclear testing and disposal of
toxic waste; the right to self-determination of all peoples;
the right to participate in decision making as equal
partners; and the necessity of reprioritizing our lifestyles
by limiting consumption.
Spirituality plays an important role in emancipatory
environmentalism.23 This indicates represents a key
ontological difference between the emancipatory and
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traditional paradigms. The first principle of environmental
justice which states that the earth has sacred value and all
life is interconnected in ecological unity. Because life is
considered to be interconnected, this principle differs from
the Cartesian ontology that informs traditional
environmentalism.
Another significant principle of environmental justice
recognizes the importance of equal participation in the
decision making process based on mutual respect for all
peoples. Thus, a further challenge to citizen participation
is the inclusion of various cultural, epistemological, and
ethical standpoints.
Since environmental justice assumes interdependence and
interconnection, then traditional decision making techniques
based on the assumptions of disinterest, separation, and
autonomy of decision makers are fundamentally flawed. This
means that Kantian-Rawlsian theories of justice and ethics
will not work as theories of environmental justice or
ethics.
In the next section, I discuss other theories of
justice.

Other Theories of Justice

Wenz proposes a theory of environmental justice that
is based on a "concentric circle theory."24 The concentric
circle theory proposes that "the closer our relationship is
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to someone or something, the greater our number of
obligations in that relationship.1,25 This is a gross
oversimplification of Wenz's theory, but the point I wanted
to make is that Wenz views environmental justice as arising
out of our relationships with others - both human and non
human nature. Within the context of relationships we can
make decisions about our responsibilities to the
environment.
Wenz argues that Rawls's theory is not practical
because people are not equal in power, some people can
coerce others using resources, and people know what they
have.26 Wenz argues that Rawls's theory is not practical
because people are not equal in power, some people can
coerce others using resources, and people know what they
have.27 Although Wenz does not explicitly argue for a
culturally specific theory of justice, he does note that
differences in social position can impact moral
decisionmaking.
Both Gilligan and Cortese discuss the importance of
relationships in moral decision making. Cortese argues that
"[r] elationships provide the context and the basis for any
type of justice, any code of moral principles for which we
live."28 Although we may understand justice as a concept,
unless justice is something we practice in relationships
with others, it is
merely a set of empty mathematical, reified
formuli...[i]f we have no deep sense of relationship,
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we may have a conceptualization of the highest level of
justice, but we will not be moral.29
Gilligan argues that women make moral decisions from an
"ethic of care" that occurs within the context of
relationships in contrast to the conception of morality as
developing from the inpersonal application of rules.30 Since
all of us exist in relationship to our environment, then
adopting a caring perspective is preferable to a rights
approach in developing a theory of environmental justice.
Wenz criticizes Rawls's theory of justice from an
environmental perspective. His conclusions are similar to
those developed by Cortese and Gilligan in someways.But a
major difference between Gilligan and Cortese's positions
and Wenz's theory is the fact that Wenz's theory is
explicitly ecocentric. While Cortese and Gilligan argue that
justice is process-oriented and contextual, none of these
theorists argue that the environment is a part of the moral
community. Thus, Wenz's theory provides us with
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ecocentric theory while the other theories are
anthropocentric.
Thus far, I have argued that Rawls's theory is
inadequate as a theory of environmental justice because of
the standpoint it requires. While the Seventeen Principles
of Environmental Justice do not explicitly suggest justice
requires a relational context, I argue that because of the
ontological assumption of interconnection a relational
context is implicitly suggested.

Ill

Gilligan, Cortese, and Wenz argue that a relational
context for making decisions about justice is preferable to
the impartial applications of rules. Their positions are
supported by Aristotle.31 Aristole argues that justice is
"another's good." Justice thus requires we consider how
others will be affected by our decisions. This implies that
decisions about justice are made within the context of
relationships. Because environmental justice requires a
relational approach, Aristotle's theory of justice may thus
serve as a more adequate theory of environmental justice
than does that of John Rawls.

Conclusions

The position taken by the EPA under the leadership of
William Reilly appeared to share many similarities with
Rawls's theory of justice. I have argued that Rawls's theory
is inadequate as a theory of environmental justice for
environmental decision making if we assume the
interdependence of all living things, and the tendency for
humans to care about and for one another.
Aristotle's principle of justice as "another's good"
may present us with a more adequate theory of environmental
justice for environmental decision making. This is because
environmental justice requires a situated perspective where
emotions and the ability to reason are valued as necessary
components of a just decision process. An environmental
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justice decision making process should thus allow for the
subjective, contextual, and specific perspectives of
historically situated subjects in specific geographic
locations. To base environmental policies on a theory of
justice that assumes a universal moral perspective is flawed
because of fundamental differences in the ontological
assumptions of traditional and emancipatory
environmentalism.
Within the emancipatory environmenatal paradigm,
citizens have both a right and a responsibility to
participate as fully functioning moral and intellectual
humans in the environmental decision making process. In the
next chapter I address the rights and responsibilities
challenge by arguing for the creation of neighborhood
environmental justice centers. Similar to the Greek polis,
neighborhood centers could serve as a public place where
community residents could develop their citizenship skills
in a local, neighborhood setting.
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CHAPTER SEVEN

AN EMANCIPATORY ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE STRATEGY

In this study I analyzed the epistemological and
ethical assumptions of the traditional environmental
decision making model, and showed that the model excludes
substantive participation by low-income and minority
citizens. I argued that the traditional model is inadequate
because it excludes citizens on two levels: structurally and
epistemologically. Structural exclusion occurs because
access to the necessary material resources for participation
in the process are shaped by class, gender, and race
relations. This exclusion is exacerbated by epistemological
and ethical assumptions that assume the white, male
perspective is normative. Thus, fundamental changes in the
epistemological presumptions of current public participation
procedures and environmental policies are necessary if the
goal of environmental justice is to be achieved.
In conclusion, I review the four challenges discussed
in the previous chapters.

Technology And The Public Values Challenge

Environmental justice advocates argue that the
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processes used to make siting decisions are unfair and
contribute to a disproportionate burden of regressive
impacts in low-income and poor communities. I have shown
that the current model does exclude women and minorities on
two levels.
Procedural fairness, as defined by environmental
justice advocates, is a deliberative process of decision
making based on principles of participatory democracy. An
emancipatory model integrates different types of knowledge
and ways of knowing into the decision process. An
emancipatory decision making model is premised on the belief
that justice arises from a discursive process that occurs
within the context of relationships. To achieve the goal of
an environmental justice in decision making, many changes
will need to occur, including changes in the public
participation guidelines, and changes in the relationships
between EPA officials and community residents.
Furthermore, explicit discussion about what constitutes
environmental justice needs to take place as part of the
environmental decision making process because there appears
to be confusion about the meaning of the term. This
definition could then serve as a heuristic guide, or guiding
principle, throughout the decision making process. The
decision making process would thus be a hermeneutic process.
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The Epistemological Challenge

I argued that an emancipatory decision process
requires recognizing the validity of alternative
epistemologies, thus integrating other ways of knowing in
the environmental decision making process. An emancipatory
decision making model would attempt to balance subjectivity
and objectivity, facts and values, reason with emotion.
Within this decision model, all participants would be
considered equals. Expert knowledge and lay knowledge would
be valued equally, thus dissolving the epistemological
barriers that prevent substantive participation.
Since the current process implicitly excludes women and
minorities, then programs should be developed that are
sensitive to the forms of expression that develops the
"voices" of women, minorities, and low income citizens. This
means the format of public meetings and hearings will need
to be changed in order to facilitate a deliberative policy
process that is open and honest and encourages the
expression of values and emotions.

The Challenge Of Public Participation

Research by Berry, Portney, and Thomson suggests that
as citizens develop a sense of empowerment, they are more
likely to participate in face-to-face political activity.
This sense of empowerment increases citizen's beliefs about
their own effectiveness in influencing local government.
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Other research suggests that citizens are more likely to
support the outcome of the distributive decision making
process when they have the opportunity to express
themselves.1
Lind and Tyler argue that
The value that citizens attach to voice
suggests that political allegiance is
enhanced by allowing open argument about
government policy. Allowing citizens to
express their opinions and disagreements
leads to feelings that fair process has
occurred in decision making, promoting
diffuse support for the political system.2
This supports the conclusion that public participation
programs are more likely to be considered legitimate if they
offer citizens real opportunities for involvement in the
policy process. To insure real legitimacy, however, citizens
should have the authority to veto corporate decisions that
violate accepted principles of environmental justice.
Since lower classes, racial minorities, and women have
been excluded from the decision making process, programs
that potentially remedy class inequities should be made a
priority in environmental justice policy strategies. This
would require broadening the scope of environmental policies
to include social justice concerns. In order to facilitate a
process that integrates environmental and social justice
concerns, EPA should consider hiring social workers with
skills in community organizing and group facilitation.
Since citizen participation programs are subject to
partisan control by the Federal, state, or local government,
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funding for programs could be generated through fines
inposed on corporations for violating environmental laws.
This could be part of the remediation paid to communities
that currently share more than their burden of hazardous
facilities. Monies for pollution prevention programs could
be funded in the same way. In fact, pollution prevention
should be a key component in all environmental justice
strategies.
Citizens will need to develop their public deliberation
skills. This could be acconplished by integrating
deliberative decision making models into the core curriculum
at all levels of school. This could potentially prepare them
to become active citizens as adults.

The Rights and Responsibilities Challenge

Although NEPA does not guarantee environmental rights,
it clearly indicates citizens have the responsibility to
protect the environment. The emancipatory environmental
paradigm enphasizes both environmental rights and
responsibilities. One way to accomplish this goal would be
to amend NEPA and all subsequent environmental policies to
include environmental justice as a policy goal. This would
be achieved by developing a balanced rights and a
responsibilities approach base on principles of
environmental democracy.
Environmental democracy requires that citizens take
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their responsibilities for participation seriously. A
deliberative, localized approach to environmental decision
making may increase the representation of lower socio
economic groups in the policy process. Since most low income
individuals are concerned with issues of survival, it may be
unrealistic to expect an increase in political participation
until class, racial, and gender inequities are addressed.
Thus, environmental justice strategies should incorporate
measures to end economic and social injustice.
How can these suggestions be implemented? First, we
must create accessible community centers where environmental
justice can be practiced at the local level. These
neighborhood environmental justice centers could serve as a
meeting place for citizens and EPA officials to hold local
focus groups to facilitate discussion about what constitutes
environmental justice within a particular locale. By
discovering and discussing ethical principles in a public
place, citizens and experts might begin to discover that
ethical and political transformations are inevitable, on
both a personal and societal level, in order to achieve the
goal of environmental justice. By developing a vision of an
environmentally just society together, community residents
and government officials could then work together to make
that vision can become a reality.
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Neighborhood Environmental Justice Centers

Environmental participation programs should be
integrated into existing city wide citizen involvement
programs. This could potentially strengthen environmental
participation programs by eliminating some of the barriers
to participation that were pointed out in Chapter Four.
In cities where citizen participation programs are not yet
institutionalized, programs could be established by
community volunteers with funds from remediation paid by
waste producing corporations. Funds from Community
Development Block Grants could be utilized to fund centers.
Centers could operate out of local schools, libraries, or
other multi-service public facilities in low-income
neighborhoods, but each center should not serve more than
one hundred people.
Neighborhood environmental justice centers would serve
as community centers where neighbors participate in numerous
activities to increase their political capacities. Copying
facilities, informational materials, educational programs,
and a location for local meetings could be established at
the centers. By locating environmental justice centers in
local neighborhoods, citizens might be more likely to access
center services and participate in environmental decisions.
By involving community volunteers in the development of
neighborhood environmental justice centers, administrative
costs could be kept to a minimum. Furthermore, centers could
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provide a place for neighborhood residents to gain community
organizing skills and other types of work experience. Social
workers could be hired to facilitate political organizing
around environmental issues in the settlement house
tradition of Jane Addam's Hull House. By developing
neighborhood centers, waste issues would find their rightful
place as issues involving community and home, families and
friends. Decisions could thus be made by neighbors within a
relational context.

Feasibility of Policy Proposal

While this may be an idealistic proposal, I believe it
has the potential to create positive change in citizens and
to build

communities. Better decisions would be made about

the environment. The spirit of community that has been
virtually lost in contemporary society could be rediscovered
as neighbors begin to care about one another and the common
ground they share.
But even if it is only a vision, the words of Margaret
Mead remind me that efforts to empower and emancipate
citizens should not be abandoned in the face of dismal
realities: "Never doubt that a small group of thoughtful and
committed citizens can change the world. Indeed it is the
only thing that ever has. "
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APPENDIX

SEVENTEEN PRINCIPLES OF ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE

The preamble and seventeen Principles of Environmental
Justice are:
We, the People of Color, gathered together at this
multinational People of Color Environmental Leadership
Summit, to begin to build a nation and international
movement of all peoples of color to fight the
destruction and taking of our lands, and communities, do
hearby re-establish our spiritual interdependence to the
sacredness of our Mother Earth; to respect and celebrate
each of our cultures,languages, and beliefs about the
natural world and our roles in healing ourselves; to ensure
environmental justice; to promote economic
alternatives
which would contribute to the development of environmentally
safe livelihoods; and, to secure our political, economic and
cultural liberation that has been denied for over 500 years
of colonization and oppression, resulting in the poisoning
of our communities and land and the genocide of our peoples,
do affirm and adopt these Principles of Environmental
Justice:
1. Environmental justice affirms the sacredness of
Mother Earth, ecological unity and the
interdependence of all species, and the right to
be free from ecological destruction.
2. Environmental justice demands that public
policy be based on mutual respect for all
peoples, free from any form of discrimination or
bias.
3. Environmental justice mandates the right to
ethical, balanced and responsible uses of land and
renewable resources in the interest of a
sustainable planet for humans and other living
things.
4. Environmental justice calls for universal
protection from nuclear testing, extraction, and
the fundamental right to clean air, land, water,
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and food.
5. Environmental justice affirms the fundamental
right to political, economic, cultural and
environmental self-determination of all peoples.
6. Environmental justice demands the cessation of
the production of all toxins, hazardous waste, and
radioactive materials, and that all past and
current producers be held strictly accountable to
the people for detoxification and the containment
at the point of production.
7. Environmental justice demands the right of all
to participate as equal partners at every level of
decision-making including needs assessment,
planning, implementation, and enforcement and
evaluation.
8. Environmental justice affirms the right of all
workers to a safe and healthy work environment,
without being forced to choose between an unsafe
livelihood and unemployment. It also affirms the
right of those who work at home to be free from
environmental hazards.
9. Environmental justice protects the right of
victims of environmental injustices to receive
full compensation and reparations for damages as
well as quality health care.
10. Environmental justice considers governmental
acts of environmental injustice a violation of
international law, the Universal Declaration on
Human Rights, and the United Nations convention on
Genocide.
11. Environmental justice must recognize a special
legal and natural relationship of Native Peoples
to the U.S. government through treaties,
agreements, compacts, and covenants which impose
upon the U. S. government a paramount obligation
and responsibility to affirm the sovereignty and
self-determination of the indigenous peoples whose
lands it occupies and holds in trusts.
12. Environmental justice affirms the need for
urban and rural ecological policies to clean up
and rebuild our cities and rural areas in balance
with nature, honoring the cultural integrity of
all our communities, and providing fair access
for all to the full range of resources.
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13. Environmental justice calls for the strict
enforcement of principles of informed consent, and
a halt to the testing of experimental
reproductive and medical procedures and
vaccinations on people of color.
14. Environmental justice opposes the destructive
operations of multinational corporations.
15. Environmental justice opposes military
occupation, repression and the exploitation of
lands, peoples and cultures, and other life forms.
16. Environmental justice calls for the education
of present and future generations which emphasizes
social and environmental issues, based on our
experience and an appreciation of our diverse
cultural perspectives.
17. Environmental justice requires that we, as
individuals, make personal and consumer choices to
consume as little of Mother Earth's resources and
to produce as little waste as possible; and to
make the conscious decisions to challenge and
reprioritize our lifestyles to ensure the health
of the natural world for present and future
generations.
From Toxic Struggles: The Theory and Practice of
Environmental Justice, edited by Richard Hofrichter,
(Philadelphia, PA: New Society Publishers, 1993), pgs. 237239.
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